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Introduction
J. B. Schneewind, in his monumental and fascinating work The /m/enf/on of 
/Autonomy (M), contends that the notion of self-governance did not appear in 
moral theory prior to the modern period. For Schneewind, "self-governance" 
refers to the ability to reason out for oneself what ought to be done and to 
initiate the performance of such action. I disagree with his account of the 
origin and place of self-governance in the history of moral philosophy. He 
locates the initial development of the notion in the modern period of 
philosophy maintaining that previous moral theories were conceived primarily 
in terms of obedience. In these moralities of obedience the average person is 
thought to be incapable of governing her life, and consequently morality for 
her consists in obedience to some authonty. I believe that Thomas Aquinas 
had a fully realized conception of self-governance, and that his conception 
was not subordinate to some overarching notion of obedience. Rather, his 
idea of self-governance forms a central component in his overall ethical 
outlook. I agree that the modem ethicists were reacting to an obedience 
conception of morality, but this obedience conception was not prominent until 
after Aquinas.
Schneewind makes clear that his motive for writing /A is not purely 
historical but that he wishes to emphasize the contemporary relevance of the 
ideas at stake.
I planned from the beginning to make Kant the focal point of this study 
because I thought, as I still do, that his conception of morality as 
autonomy provides a better place to start working out a contemporary
philosophical understanding than anything we can get from other past 
philosophers/
I agree with Schneewind that contemporary moral theories can be enriched 
through close attention to particular historical accounts. However, I disagree 
with his insistence that the modem period and Kant should be the starting 
point. I believe that there is a rich pre-modem tradition of thought about self- 
governance and related notions, and that Aquinas' view provides advantages 
to us that Kant's understanding does not. My practical aim for treating a pre­
modern understanding of self-governance is to show its advantages for 
contemporary ethics and social thought.
I begin with an overview of Schneewind's project, highlighting issues I 
wish to challenge. I proceed to offer an overview of the pre-Thomistic history 
of self-governance. In this overview I emphasize the importance of clarifying 
various historical conceptions of the person or self, for I maintain that in 
identifying notions of self-governance, it is helpful first to understand the self 
that is governing. My proposal is that at least beginning with Socrates, when 
conflicts over what constitutes the true self and paths to eudla/mon/a erupt, 
there occur sustained discussions on the nature and role of self-governance. I 
proceed to follow this thread of self and self-governance up to the time of 
Aquinas in the work of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine.
I then develop an interpretation of Aquinas' moral theory that shows 
the centrality of self-governance in his moral philosophy. I initially treat his 
anthropological and psychological notions with the aims of addressing his
Schneewind, p. xiv.
notion of the self and showing how self-governance is possible in and shaped 
by his moral psychology. Having established that a person is psychologically 
capable of directing or governing his life, I turn to the distinct issue of each 
person's right to govern himself, for included in Schneewind's interpretation of 
the pre-modems is the idea that most individuals do not have a legitimate 
claim to govern themselves. Here I focus on Aquinas' concept of prudenf/a. I 
end my interpretation of Aquinas with an analysis of the proper role of 
obedience in his theory.
I believe Schneewind is right to think that modem moral philosophers 
were formulating theories of self-govemance in response to theories whose 
overriding concept was obedience. However, he mistakenly characterizes all 
of pre-modem moral philosophy as obedience-based. I maintain that the 
obedience tradition originated in the late-medieval period after Aquinas, /^ly 
dissertation concludes with a defense of my general view conceming these 
shifts in emphasis and formulation of ethical theory during the medieval and 
early modem period. Schneewind is correct that self-govemance should be 
given a privileged position in contemporary moral theory, but he is incorrect in 
thinking that the work of Kant should be the focus in seeking an 
understanding of the nature of self-govemance.
Chapter 1 : Schneewind's Analysis
1.1 : The Value of Self-Governance
Intuitively, it seems that a basic desire we have as human persons is to have 
the ability and authority to direct our own lives as we see fit in some 
substantial way. Part of what makes life worth living is the ability to place 
one's own stamp on life through the exercise of one's own capacities of self- 
direction. To paraphrase Socrates, the un-self-governed life is not worth 
living. Accordingly, a philosophical theory seeldng to explain and justify 
principles and meüiods pertaining to human tmhavior should include the role 
of self-govemance. Furthermore, the viability of such a moral theory for 
contemporary ethics seems to hinge on the inclusion of a positive and central 
role for self-govemance.
In light of the importance of self-govemance sensed by our intuitions 
and confirmed through our experience, we must endeavor to provide the best 
possible account of its nature and role. Historical analyses of this issue 
fumish vast conceptual resources for accomplishing tfie task of articulating 
and defending a robust conception of self-govemance suited for our present 
situation. Additionally, given that our current theories employ ideas which 
have been handed down to us from earlier times, it is prudent, if not 
necessary, to examine the original theories and respective contexts to best 
understand the ideas in question. We tum to the intellectual past to help 
render an acceptable account for the present.
1.2: Schneewind's Account
i. Obedience versus Self-Governance
"Kant invented the conception of morality as autonomy."  ^ With this 
bold assertion, Schneewind begins his ambitious study of modem moral 
philosophy, and for the reasons already mentioned, Kant is the focal point of 
the study. Schneewind interprets Kant's moral theory as a proposed solution 
to a large set of issues, concepts, and problems that arose in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Social, political, religious, and other upheavals and 
changes occurring in the transition from late medieval to the modem period of 
Europe triggered the reconceptualization of moral theory. Various 
reconceptualizations and reformulations prompted many thinkers, including 
Kant, to "invent" new methods and concepts to best account for the changes. 
TTre /nvenf/on of Autonomy closely examines the two hundred year span of 
social change and accompanying thought preceding Kant in order to clarify 
the surfacing set of issues, concepts, and problems that Kanfs moral theory 
seeks to address.
Schneewind begins his study by calling attention to the older (pre­
modem) conceptions of morality. He mentions without challenge the 
prevailing view of medieval moral philosophy that revolves around obedience 
to God as the central tenet.
On the older conception, morality is to be understood most deeply as 
one aspect of the obedience we owe to God. In addition, most of us 
are in a moral position in which we must obey other human beings. 
God's authority over all of us is made known to us by reason as well as 
by revelation and the clergy. But we are not all equally able to see for
Schneewind, p. 3.
ourselves what morality requires. Even if everyone has the most 
fundamental laws of morality written in their hearts or consciences, 
most people need to be instructed by some appropriate authority about 
what is morally required in particular cases. And because most people 
usually do not understand the reasons for doing what morality directs, 
threats of punishment as well as offers of reward are necessary in 
order to assure sufficient compliance to bring about moral order.^
Against this backdrop, the story of modem moral philosophy is the gradual
whittling away at the obedience conception in favor of a conception of
morality as self-govemance.
The new outlook that emerged by the end of the eighteenth century 
centered on the belief that all normal individuals are equally able to live 
together in a morality of self-governance. All of us, on this view, have 
an equal ability to see for ourselves what morality calls for and are in 
principle equally able to move ourselves to act accordingly, regardless 
of threats and rewards from others.^
Schneewind contends that the conception of morality as ot)edience 
was the only viable option for theorists until the thought of Machiavelli and 
Montaigne. Moreover, it was not until the early eighteenth century that a self- 
conscious attempt to create a moral theory centered on self-governance 
began. On this interpretation, in the early modem period, but before the 
eighteenth century, thinkers sought to integrate self-governance into the 
dominant obedience conceptions of morality. At the onset of the eighteenth 
century, a new project began that sought to reformulate the underlying moral 
framework in order to eliminate the basis of ot)edience altogether in favor of 
self-govemance.
The reconceived self-governance conception enteiiled that each normal 
person has sufficient moral knowledge to understand what to do and a
 ^Schneewind, p. 4.
Schneewind, p. 4.
sufficient motivational capacity to be able to do it without the assistance or 
interference of others. Working within this context, Kant invents the concept 
of autonomy in the strong sense of the term. By autonomy Kant means that 
human beings themselves legislate to themselves the moral law by the action 
of the rational will.
H. Locating Historical Shifts
In the course of my dissertation, I am going to dispute many of 
Schneewind's contentions in detail. However, at this point, I wish to paint a 
broad-stroke picture of what I think is wrong with his overview, as well as the 
main lines of his position that I think are generally correct. Schneewind is 
right to interpret modem moral philosophers as understanding themselves to 
be reacting to an obedience-based conception of morality and in tum offering 
a “new” formulation of morality based on self-governance. Where he is 
mistaken is in his location of the period where the obedience conception was 
dominant.
What I propose is that the dominant ethical tradition from the Greeks to 
at least Aquinas prized self-govemance as one of the key elements in an 
adequate moral theory. Towards the end of the medieval period and on in to 
the early modem period, the dominant moral theory found in the writings of 
the most influential thinkers was some form of divine command theory, which 
did center on obedience as the basic ethical concept, at least relative to the 
moral agent. During this period, even scholars who understood themselves 
to t)e following in the footsteps of Aquinas proffered theories and
interpretations of Aquinas that emphasized obedience at the expense of self- 
govemance.
So, Schneewind rightly senses a revolution of sorts in moral theory 
occurring in the modem period, but where he errs is in missing the initial 
revolution that occurred in the midst of the medieval period. The invention of 
autonomy and self-govemance was in part a reinvention of the ancient Greek 
moral tradition continued by Aquinas and other medieval thinkers. I believe 
that Schneewind's complete preclusion of the ancient Greek moral tradition is 
further evidence that he misses this initial shift in moral theory, for Aquinas 
and other medieval thinkers conceived various elements of their ethical 
theories in terms of the moral precedent set by the Greek tradition.
I wish, then, to take issue primarily with Schneewind's interpretation of 
Aquinas' moral theory and neglect of the Greek moral tradition that hinders 
his interpretation of Aquinas. I am leaving aside many important elements of 
his massive study with which I have no quarrel. In my following overview of 
Schneewind's /A I will focus on his interpretation of Aquinas' moral theory, the 
rise of modem natural law moral theory, and finally Kanfs moral theory.
iii. Aquinas
An important thread that runs throughout Schneewind's analysis is the 
impact on a moral theory from the way God's relationship to the moral life is 
construed. Throughout this period there were two basic approaches to 
keeping God essential to morality (which was a priority for most of the
theorists). Using the standard terminology, Schneewind refers to the two
approaches as "voluntarism " and "intellectualism."
Voluntarists hold that God created morality and imposed it upon us by 
an arbitrary fiat of his will. He is essential to morality, therefore, 
because he created it and can always, in principle, alter it...On the 
other approach, often called "intellectualism," God did not create 
morality. When he gives us moral commandments, his will is guided 
by his intellect's knowledge of eternal standards.^
The twist and turns of how God is related to morality affected a good number
of thinkers in this period, including Kant. The first main figure in
Schneewind's narrative is Aquinas, and part of what is noteworthy about
Aquinas' theory is its intellectualism.
Schneewind's interpretation of Aquinas' moral theory centers on the
letter's notion of natureil law. For Aquinas, human beings have a proper mode
of operation and conduct that is defined by the law directing us to our divinely
ordained end. God promulgates to us this law. For the intellectualist
Aquinas, God's reason contains the etemal standard (the law) by which to
guide human nature to its end, and therefore, the law is unchangeable. The
key issue is our epistemic access to this law. Explaining Aquinas' stance,
Schneewind states.
We can know the laws because seeds of them are naturally implanted 
in the part of the consdence that Thomas calls the synferes/s (s/c ).
But although everyone has some grasp of the most basic law, not 
everyone has the same ability to become fully aware, without 
assistance, of what follows from it. The truth," as Thomas says, "is 
the same for all, but it is not equally known to all." There are two 
reasons for this inequality. One is the sinful nature we inherited from 
Adam...Another is that some of the conclusions to be drawn from the
Schneewind, p. 9.
laws of nature require so much consideration of circumstance that "not 
all are able to do this carefully, but only those who are wise."^
Essentially, on Schneewind's interpretation most human beings do not even
have the capacities necessary to govern themselves, which is one reason
why they find themselves in a position of moral obedience owed to some
authority.
Schneewind considers Aquinas' interpretation of St. Paul's teaching in 
Romans 2:14-15, which seems to hint at self-governance. Paul's passage 
reads as follows.
For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things 
contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto 
themselves. Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, 
their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the 
meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.
Schneewind contends that Aquinas understands this passage in such a way
as to preclude the possibility of self-govemance.
[Paul's dictum] does not say that we rule ourselves [according to 
Aquinas]. "[P]roperly speaWng," Thomas says, "none imposes a law 
on his own actions." Through our awareness of the laws of nature, 
however imperfect, we participate in God's etemal law. But St. Paul 
means that the law is within us not only "as in one who rules, but 
also...as in one that is ruled."
Even though Aquinas affirms in this passage that the law is in us as "one who
rules," Schneewind concludes on the basis of the last clause that for Aquinas,
"Our participation in the etemal law shows that we are not self-governed. We
are governed by another."  ^ He interprets Aquinas' stance to include two key
features that preclude realizable self-govemance. The first is that we lack the
 ^Schneewind, pp. 20-21.
 ^Schneewind, p. 21.
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capacities necessary to govern ourselves. Furthermore, we lack the right to 
govern ourselves. This is the logical consequence of the idea, at least on 
Schneewind's interpretation, that only God has the right to govern us with the 
law He has ordained for our nature.
Evident in this analysis of Aquinas is Schneewind's underlying complex 
notion of self-govemance. In the course of /A, Schneewind relies on ein 
understanding of self-governcince as comprised of three main components.
In his interpretation of Aquinas, he makes distinct points about each of these 
aspects of self-govemance. While he does not clearly specify these 
conditions, I think it is important to identify them since these conditions and 
constituents of self-govemance recur throughout his analysis and play a 
significant role in my own argument.
Schneewind's basic distinction is between a person's psychological 
capacities and a person's proper authority or right to exercise those 
capacities, or in the case of his interpretation of Aquinas, a person's lack of 
authority in that only God can properly govem. This separation is common in 
the related literature.^  Schneewind divides the psychological conditions into 
two: the epistemic and motivational requirements. There are, then, three 
conditions for self-govemance according to Schneewind. Each constitutes a 
necessary condition for a minimally acceptable account of self-govemance, 
but jointly they make up a sufficient condition.
 ^Christman. See especially Christman's "Introduction," and Joel Feinberg's 
"Autonomy."
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Epistemic Requirement: Self-govemance presupposes that a person 
possesses the capacity for the awareness of moral standards in order 
to know how to govern her conduct.
Motivational Requirement: Self-governance entails the ability to 
initiate action based on internal sources of motivation, and not to be 
moved merely out of fear of punishment, promise of reward, or other 
such extemal motivational sources.
Authority/Right Requirement: Whether a person has the 
psychological capacities necessary for self-governance, no person is 
self-goveming in Schneewind's sense unless he has the proper 
authority to exercise those capacities. An acceptable account of self- 
govemance includes a person's right or proper authority to exercise 
self-governance.
On Schneewind's interpretation, then, Aquinas' moral theory lacks realizable 
self-govemance in that the vast majority of people lack the psychological 
capacities necessary for self-govemance, and all people lack the appropriate 
moral authority to self-govem in that we are govemed exclusively by God.
iv. The Rise of New Natural Law Theory 
After his interpretation of Aquinas, Schneewind proceeds to give an 
account of the rise of what he calls the new natural law theory. In the final 
chapter I will explain and defend in detail my interpretation conceming the 
shift in the medieval period from a self-governance dominated conception of 
morality to a an ot)edience-based divine command theory. However, some 
general contours of this shift can be detected in Schneewind's own account, 
though he doesn't seem to realize their implications. The changes he 
discusses are those conceming the transition from intellectualism in ethics to 
voluntarism. He tracks the adaptations through Scotus, Ockham, Luther, and
12
Calvin, after which he treats Suarez's theory of law and obligation at some 
length.
Suarez developed his own theory in large part through commentary on
Aquinas' work, most notably on law. Aquinas understands the nature of law
to be first and foremost a dictate of reason. Suarez reformulates to some
extent Aquinas' concept of law/natural law. For Suarez the natural law is in
part something ordained by God for the good of human beings, as it is in
Aquinas, but he also forcefully stresses the preceptive function of the law and
that from which the force of the law is derived. "Law, unlike advice or
counsel, must involve the command of a superior."  ^ This command issues
from God's will. In effect, then, God's will is the source of moral obligation.
Hugo Grotius goes a few steps further and reconceives natural law in
such a way as to sever the link between it and the human good, i.e. the good
in the sense of an ordained fe/os of human nature. He believes a law resting
solely on naturalistic (non-theistic) assumptions provides the only hope of
employing the law to resolve actual disputes, especially international
disputes. Instead of justifying the natural law by appealing to a divine
lawgiver or a final end, Grotius appeals to the facts of human nature that any
person has access to by empirical means. Schneewind terms Grotius'
conception of human nature the "Grotian problematic," which is compactly
characterized in the following passage.
We are self-preserving and quarrelsome beings; but we are also 
sociable. These two aspects of human nature make the problem of 
maintaining the social order quite definite: how are quarrelsome but
Schneewind, p. 59.
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socially minded beings like ourselves to live together? What limits 
must we place on our tendency to controversy in order to satisfy our 
sociable desires? Grotius's central thought is that the laws of nature 
are empirically discoverable directives that show us how to solve this 
problem
Grotius' reformulation of the natural law promised to be more
serviceable to the emerging and ongoing social changes than the old
formulation based on natural teleology and a divine lawgiver. This new
empirical natural law structure was widely influential, yet it was also thought to
lack an adequate account of obligation. In Hobbes, we find the Grotian
problematic pushed to the extreme with a brazen emphasis on human
selfishness, but with an accompanying strong account of obligation accounted
for through psychological necessity or self-interested prudence. The following
passage from Schneewind offers both a good illustration of the changing
models of natural law and a helpful exposition of Hobbes' theory of obligation.
There are some differences between Hobbes's use of the idea that a 
command is necessary in order to make laws out of mere theorems of 
prudence and Suarez's use. Hobbes does not use God's command, 
as Suarez does, to explain how natural law obligates or creates "a 
moral impulse to action" (De Leg/bus II. VI. 22). The Suarezian moral 
impulse may be the impulse to righteousness, or to compliance with 
law as such, but that, as I have noted, is absent from Hobbes's theory. 
Hobbes agrees instead with Grotius in thinking that reason teaches us 
directives whose obligatory force does not depend on God. If 
command is needed for law, it is unnecessary for obligation.
The obligatory force trickles up from each person's contractual agreement.
The sovereign must be able to order his commonwealth simply by 
uttering commands, thereby transmitting the strength of each subject's 
general contractual obedience to the specific laws needed in daily 
life.^ ^
Schneewind, p. 72. 
Schneewind, pp. 96-97.
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Proponents of the new natural law theory can not be said to have 
welcomed Hobbes' contribution to it. Generally, Hobbes' assumptions about 
human nature were considered unpalatable and inaccurate. His account of 
God was labeled heretical. Finally, key figures such as Cumberland, 
Pufendorf, and Locke were skeptical about Hobbes' account of obligation 
itself. They did not believe his account sufficiently justified the binding force 
of obligation. As a result, these natural lawyers would reintegrate God's will 
into tfieir theories in order to justify a person's obligation to obey the law.
For instance, Pufendorf accepts the Grotian problematic but is 
unsatisfied with both Grotius' and Hobbes' account of obligation. 
Consequently, his own theory of natural law shares many of Grotius' 
assumptions about human nature and the essential conflict-resolving aim of 
Grotius' account. Nevertheless, he adds to the basic Grotian schema in order 
to account for and justify the concepts of law and obligation. To do this, he 
introduces the notion of "moral entities." The nature of these moral entities is 
largely beside the point. What is relevant is the function they play in his moral 
theory. Morality is based on these entities. However, these entities are 
things imposed on human beings by God's will. So in effect, morality and the 
obligation to follow its precepts arise from the command of God's will.
Schneewind introduces Locke as consciously working within the 
Cumberland and Pufendorfian formulations of natural law. Locke's own 
account of natural law is an attempt to expand on the main ideas in these 
formulations, which in turn places him in the Grotian tradition.
It is better to take [Locke] to be working with the modem natural law 
framework than to be using a Thomistic view. His description of the 
state of nature is Grotian without being Hobbesian. Grotian sociability 
as well as need draw us together...At the same time there is enough 
discord to drive us to seek a ruler as a remedy...Controversies among 
sociable beings seem therefore to set the problem that gives law its 
utility. Law directs rational free agents to their own interests.^ ^
Locke affirms the empirical epistemic access to the law, but he believes that
most people are incapable of understanding the law in this way, so they
cannot see for themselves what ought to be done. Hence, morality for them
consists primarily of obedience to those who do understand the law. The law
itself, moreover, arises from God's will.
The last main figure in the natural law story, Christian Thomasius, initiates
the theoretical transformation from obedience-based to self-govemance-
based conceptions of morality. In Schneewind's words, the integration of
self-govemance into moral theory becomes self-conscious at this point.
Thomasius wants to eliminate the obedience conception altogether, and
instead formulate morality (in this case natural law theory) in terms of self-
govemance. He begins this transformation by reconceiving the relationship
between God and humanity with respect to law and obligation.
Thomasius cibandons the thesis that God enforces his will by threats of 
punishment. A wise God is a teacher rather than lawgiver...[Due to 
God's nature as teacher] the standard natural law distinction tmtween 
advising or counseling and obligating must also be revised. To 
obligate someone, the legislator must have the power to make it 
necessary, by threat, for someone to do what the obligator wants. 
Thomasius retains the natural law distinction between what a teacher 
does in counseling and what a superior does in issuing a command.
But he no longer says that what a commanding superior does is to 
obligate. A superior rules. And he almost says that God's directives 
are to be taken as counseling. God is a father, and "a father's
12Schneewind, p. 143.
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directions are more Counsels than Rules" (Fundamenfa 1.5.41). God 
directs us to our good, and we can understand what that is. In terms of 
the standard distinction, Thomasius is saying that it is up to us to take 
or reject God's directives. Obedience is not our primary relation to 
him.
With Thomasius, on Schneewind's interpretation, morality ceases to be
obedience-based, or at least a new strand in ethical theory begins that is not
based in obedience. This sets in motion the conscious attempts to
reconceive morality fundamentally in terms of self-governance, but not in
terms of autonomy.
Clarke tried to move beyond the contingencies of desire by tying 
motivation directly to immediate awareness of the laws of morality.
Price and Reid follow him in holding that everyone equally can know 
what morality requires and thus have some psychologically moving 
reason for acting properly. They do not, however, think that we give 
ourselves the laws of the morality we are to follow. Even if we need 
neither outside instruction not outside motivation, our moral knowledge 
is knowledge of an order independent of us, and our psychology 
enables us to bring ourselves into conformity with it. We are self- 
governing, for these thinkers, but not autonomous.^ ^
Schneewind understands that the actual historical movements in moral
theory shift from obedience-based conceptions, to theories of self-
governance, and then with Kant we find a theory that is rooted in autonomy,
which, again, includes self-govemance. Prior to Kant, theories of self-
governance included accounts of how people can know what morality
requires, how it is that people can motivate themselves to action through
some internal source of motivation, and why it is that people should be
allowed to exercise these capacities. However, according to Schneewind,
none of these theories included tfie idea that it is the rational will itself that
Schneewind, pp. 161-162. 
Schneewind, pp. 513-514.
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legislates or makes the moral law, which is what automony specifically refers 
to. That is why Schneewind labels pre-Kantian theories as self-govemance- 
based, but not properly autonomous. It is up to Kant to invent the concept of 
autonomy.
V. Kant
Kant's invention of autonomy can be understood as a response to
several issues, puzzles, and inadequacies he found in preceding moral
theories. Kant was deeply influenced by some of the modern natural lawyers,
especially their empirical human psychology.
Kant's view of the facts of human psychology ally him with the 
empiricists; and it is thus not surprising that the empiricist natural 
lawyers should have provided him with what he took to be the central 
problem conceming human sociability. He did not accept their 
solution; but he thought they were essentially right in seeing the issue 
of social conflict as the first problem for which morality had to be 
suited. The natural law theorists thought only a morality built around a 
specific concept of law and obligation would be serviceable. They ran 
into difficulties in explaining their concepts. Kant meant his own theory 
to clear up the difficulties.
The empiricists’ inclusion of God's commands as the source of law and 
obligation was unacceptable to Kant. He thought such a source of obligation 
would create a heteronomous motivation on the part of the rational agent. 
Heteronomy literally means being ruled or govemed by another. Citing God's 
will as the source of obligation and thereby the reason to obey the moral law 
entails that the agent who obeys is simply submitting to the will of another 
being, thereby forfeiting self-rule in favor of rule by another. Heteronomy 
struck at the very heart of self-govemance and had to be eliminated. Also, a
15 Schneewind, p. 518.
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Hobbesian notion of law and obligation resulting from self-interested 
prudence was unserviceable in that it did not do justice to what Kant thought 
was the absolute character of obligation.
Kanfs solution was to invent the concept of autonomy. By having 
each person's rational will itself legislate the moral law, Kant believed he was 
able to preserve both a strong conception of law and an account of obligation 
that was compatible with self-governance. Within Kant's theory, it is the fact 
of autonomy that creates the possibility for self-govemance. It accomplishes 
this task by securing the independence of each person from the authority of 
any other person or institution. In other words, no moral obedience is owed to 
any other person by the mature rational agent.
The will's legislative ability also eliminates the natural lawyers' need of 
God’s will to legislate the law. Once the source of the law is internalized to 
the agent himself, the obligation to obey the law is internalized to one's own 
rational will. In submitting to the moral law, the agent is not submitting to the 
will of another being, but rather he is submitting to himself-his own will. In 
sum, for Kant, we can govem ourselves because and only because we are 
autonomous.
The three conditions for full self-govemance are met for Kant. In self- 
legislating the moral law, a person has full epistemic access to the law, i.e., 
she knows what she is to do. The motivational requirement is met through 
Kant's notion of the motive of duty or respect of the law. Finally, each person
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has a right to exercise self-govemance in virtue of the absolute value of his 
rational nature, which itself is partly defined by the will's legislative function.
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Chapter 2: Pre-Thomistic Tradition
2.1 : Introduction
Other writers have noted that self-governance has roots in the pre-modem
era. For instance, consider the claims made by Christman in his introduction
to a work devoted to contemporary issues in self-governance.
Ideas and theories that make crucial use of the notion of autonomy, or 
what amount to close variations on that theme, are ubiquitous in the 
history of Western moral and political philosophy. Plato's view of the 
ruling part of the soul which represents the highest self-the purely 
intellectual part of the person poised to act on the basis of ideas alone- 
begins one strand in the concept. This was picked up and expanded by 
Augustine, in his insistence that the truly free person is guided only by 
the rational part of the soul. The Stoics, especially Epictetus, echo 
another major theme in their ideal of the truly free person as one 
moved only by rational desires, free of "lower impulses and unfulfillable 
wishes.^ ^
I believe Christman is right to call attention to elements within this early 
tradition of moral thought as relevant to the notion of autonomy. However, 
perhaps due to its sweeping range, I do not think his points are quite 
accurate, at least, I do not think they pertain to the notion of self-govemance 
as outlined by Schneewind, and accepted by me. This chapter will be 
devoted to treating some key figures and their accounts of self-govemance, in 
the history of moral philosophy leading to Aquinas, namely, Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine. I hope to accomplish two aims in this 
chapter. I wish to bolster my contention against Schneewind that the notion 
of self-govemance was present in and key to pre-modem moral theories. The 
second aim mirrors Schneewind's approach to Kant's moral theory in /A. By 
attending to the significant developments in the moral tradition prior to
16Christman , p. 4.
21
Aquinas, I should be in a better position to explain why Aquinas construed his 
theory the way he did, what his theory seeks to accomplish, and how his 
overall approach might help us to work out a viable moral theory for our own 
time.
In the course of my analysis I will recurrently touch upon and address 
certain issues. The distinct elements that go into Schneewind's account of 
self-governance will be at the forefront of these recurring concerns. The first 
cluster of issues concern the psychological conditions requisite for governing 
oneself: the epistemic and motivational capacities. The former constitutes a 
person's epistemic access to the moral law or whatever standard is thought to 
rightly guide one's actions. The latter is comprised by a person's ability to 
bring herself to perform an action without some external threat of punishment 
or promise of reward. The other issue pertains to a person’s right to govern 
herself. This is to say that even if one met the psychological requirements 
necessary for self-govemance, there is still the question whether she has a 
just claim to exercise these capacities. Within the Greek tradition, there is a 
largely homogenous stance on this last issue.
The general stance pertains to their tight correlation between the 
psychological capacities relevant to self-govemance and the proper authority 
to exercise those capacities. For the Greeks, the authority requirement is 
simply reducible to the satisfaction of the epistemic and motivational 
conditions. If a person has the requisite moral knowledge and the ability to 
initiate action through some internal source of motivation, then it follows that
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she has the proper authority to exercise those abilities through self- 
govemance. In other words, what confers the authority to exercise self- 
governance is the possession of the necessary psychological capacities. All 
of the philosophers to be considered in this tradition affirm this basic schema 
in some form.
Conversely, because the possession of the relevant psychological 
capacities bestows the proper authority to exercise self-govemance, if a 
person were to lack any or all of the capacities in question, he would thereby 
lack any rightful claim to direct his own life. For this reason, the importance of 
education, especially moral education, is continually stressed throughout this 
tradition of thought. For instance, children should not be allowed to direct 
their own activity even if they have the potential to do so because this 
potential is in need of development and refinement through proper education. 
These educational concems are an instance of this tradition's general focus 
on the psychological capacities of human nature, such as intellectual powers, 
desires, emotions, etc. The widespread emphasis on such capacities is due 
in part to these philosophers' aim of articulating a coherent, realizable, and 
suitable notion of self-govemance.
An important addition to the attention given to psychological capacities 
is a point conceming the notion of self-control (Greek: sqphmsune, Latin: 
tempe/anf/a). Self-control/moderation/temperance is explicated often with 
such descriptions as "self-mastery" and "ruling oneself." This notion applies 
to a person's psychological abilities and how they are integrated with one
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another. The substantial point pertaining to my project is that self-control is 
not equivalent to self-govemance. Self-govemance refers to the abilities to 
reason out for oneself what course or courses of action would be appropriate 
and to initiate such a course of action. That is the phenomenon to which self- 
govemance refers, at least according to Schneewind, and I agree. I stress 
this point because the notions are sufficiently similar to cause confusion.
That being said, there is an almost familial relationship between the two 
concepts that holds for much of the pre-modern tradition. According to the 
dominant tradition of pre-modem moral theory, the exercise of self- 
govemance cannot take place without a healthy dose of self-control on the 
part of the agent. Perhaps it is more accurate to say to govern oneself well, 
one must be self-controlled. Either way, conceptually and often othen/vise, 
discussions of self-govemance occur within close proximity to discussions on 
self-control.
The focus on self-govemance in the pre-modem tradition up to and 
including Aquinas is, in turn, for the sake of the basic goal that motivates 
engagement into ethics to begin with, namely in order to achieve eudaimon/a. 
Because of its ubiquity in ethical theory throughout the pre-modern era, 
eudaimonism is a pivotal notion for my project. In a eudaimonistic theory, the 
basic structure revolves around the notion of euda/mon/a/happiness/ 
flourishing. Flourishing is the goal of our activities, the goal of what we do. 
Therefore, we ought always to do those actions and activities that are 
conducive to this state of flourishing. This moral structure determines the
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content of good and bad things by reference to the goal of happiness. 
Brickhouse and Smith call this structure the "principle of eudaimonism," which 
asserts that "a thing is good only insofar as it is conducive to fiappiness."^  ^
Conversely, a thing is bad insofar as it hinders or interferes with one's ability 
to achieve happiness.
The nature and role of seff-governance in any given theory is going to 
rest upon or presuppose some antecedent conception of the person or self 
since it is that self that is doing the governing. In the ensuing theories, such a 
self is eudaimonist. Pervasive in all of these accounts is the basic 
characterization of a person's motivational structure by reference to 
eudaimonistic considerations.^  ^ Put weakly, in a eudamonist theory, all 
persons desire happiness and indirectly those actions, activities, or objects 
that are conducive to happiness. The eudaimonist self, then, wants to 
perform those actions and seek those objects that are conducive to 
flourishing. Eudaimonistic considerations also affect the way in which moral 
standards are characterized. These standards represent the object of 
knowledge that is relevant to self-govemance. I will discuss these issues in 
detail as I treat each philosopher's moral theory.
^^Brickhouse and Smith, p. 103.
I intend to keep this account sufficiently general so as to not equate "psychological 
eudaimonism" with eudaimonism itself. For an overview of psychological 
eudaimonism see Irwin, p. 53.
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2.2: Socrates
My historical overview begins with Socrates. Plato's Gorp/as provides a case
study in the themes that I wish to address concerning self-governance, while
Book I of the Repub//c also neatly supplements these themes. I will assume
that the Socrates of these dialogues was a thinker distinct from Plato, but the
theses of my investigation do not depend upon that assumption.^ ^
Socrates made the notion of a true or ideal self a critical part of his
moral philosophy. A memorable feature of Socrates' life is his devotion to
living out the Delphic injunction "Know Thyself." His remarks conceming
morality and knowledge seem to commit him to the view that there is a true
and authentic self that is not readily transparent and requires a healthy
degree of self-examination to discover. Brickhouse and Smith offer the
following summary of this true-self interpretation.
Socrates of the Go/p/as had a conception of a "true self," which each 
of us can discover only through the sort of reflective introspection 
Socrates takes his efenchos to promote. This "seir is the one 
Socrates believes the Delphic injunction exhorts us to know.^
Socrates' life, like his philosophy, is in part a search for the nature of this true
self, a self that he t)elieves is knowable through self-examination, reflection,
and dialogue with others. Ethics is concerned with how one ought to live.
The "one" in question is the true self, which we will see in the Go/p/as.
For a clear overview of the positions concerning this issue in Plato's dialogues see
Kraut.
20 ,Brickhouse and Smith, p. 102.
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i. Gorg/as
The Go/y/as, on the whole, addresses issues concerning the
foundation of ethical standards, most importantly standards of justice, and
what constitutes the best life, or at least the better life among the considered
possibilities. Socrates engages in three distinct, though related, discussions
with separate interlocutors: Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. With Gorgias he
treats the topic of the benefits and harms of rhetoric and then engages in a
similar analysis of justice, featuring Polus. Finally, Socrates squares off with
Callicles. Their discussion represents the most extended debate of the three,
and it will be the focus of my commentary.
Socrates concludes his conversation with Polus having argued for the
claim that suffering injustice is better for the individual than committing
injustice. Callicles adamantly rejects Socrates contention and in turn offers
his own accounts of the origin of justice and moral standards in general.
I believe that the people who institute our laws are the weak and the 
many. They do this, and they assign praise and blame with 
themselves and their own advantage in mind. They're afraid of the 
more powerful among men, the ones who are capable of having a 
greater share, and so they say that getting more than one's share is 
"shameful" and "unjust," and that doing what's unjust is trying to get 
more than one's share. They do this so that those people won't get a 
greater share than they. I think they like getting an equal share, since 
they are inferior. These are the reasons why trying to get a greater 
share than most is said to be unjust and shameful by law and why they 
call it doing what's unjust.
Conventional justice, according to Callicles, is instituted by the weak in order 
to restrain the strong. Such justice's inhibiting dynamism actually causes the
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strong to be worse off than they otherwise would have been, had they been 
unrestrained.
Callicles believes that there is an authentic and true notion of justice
that nature proposes. This natural justice is radically distinct from
conventional justice.
But I believe that nature itself reveals that if s a just thing for the better 
man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the 
worse man and less capable man. Nature shows that this is so in 
many places; but among the other animals and in whole cities and 
races of men, it shows that this is what justice has been decided to be: 
that the supenor rule the inferior and have a greater share than they. 
(483b-d).^ ^
This true morality leads to real flourishing and happiness for the better and 
more capable man. In Callides' opinion, Socrates wrongly equates true 
justice with conventional justice. Consequently, Socrates misconstrues the 
correct path to flourishing by promoting conformity to social convention, and 
by doing so precludes the possibility that those who by nature are strong will 
have the opportunity to flourish.
Socrates and Callicles are clearly at odds about the nature of justice. 
Nevertheless, there is a deep source of agreement by them that underpins 
their respective analyses and subsequent arguments. This agreement lies in 
their basic understanding of the ideal purpose of moral standards. For both, 
euda/mon/a or flourishing is the goal of our actions and activities. Ideally, we 
should live the life we do and direct our activities we perform in order to 
achieve euda/mor?/a. They disagree as to the means to this end, but they 
both accept the same structure for morality and the determination of what
21 Plato. Gorp/as.
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constitutes good and bad. This shared morai framework determines what
type of strategy is in place for the critical analysis of each opponent's position.
The strategy is to demonstrate that the favored proposal keys in on activities
that actually lead to a state of flourishing, while the other account does not.
Socrates questions Callicles conceming the letter's account of what
makes one man superior to another and how that grants tlie "superior" license
to rule over others. Since Callicles' account of justice turns on this notion of a
man being superior by nature, Socrates is questioning the very core of
Callicles' position. The following passage picks up with Callicles' continuing
response to this line of questioning. Socrates criticizes Callicles for ignoring
the crucial role that self-control plays in the pursuit of happiness.
Callicles: But I've already said that I mean those who are intelligent in 
the affairs of the city, and brave, too. It's fitting that they should t)e the 
ones who rule their cities, and whafs just is that they, as the rulers,
should have a greater share then the others, the ruled.
Socrates: But what of themselves, my friend?
Callicles; What of what?
Socrates: Ruling or being ruled?
Callicles: What do you mean?
Socrates: I mean each individual ruling himself. Or is there no need at 
all for him to rule himself, but only to rule others?
Callicles: What do you mean, rule himself?
Socrates: Nothing very subtle. Just what the many mean: t)eing self­
controlled and master of oneself, ruling the pleasures and appetites 
within oneself (491d-e).
This passage is extremely important for two reasons. The passage 
illustrates Socrates bringing the notion of self-control (sophrosune  ^into the 
debate. Here, he simply elaborates on what the notion involves, but 
throughout the rest of the discussion Socrates will repeatedly praise self- 
control as necessary to achieve happiness, while Callicles will scoff at such
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appraisals. In fact, self-control becomes a driving theme in Socrates' brand of 
eudaimonism. That is significant both for a proper understanding of Socrates' 
moral theory, and for an adequate understanding of subsequent eudaimonist 
accounts, since Socratic eudaimonism sets the standard for how such moral 
theory should be construed. The second point of interest relates to the 
relationship between the notions of self-control and self-govemance, which I 
will treat momentarily.
In the debate stemming from the passage quoted above, Socrates and 
Callicles clarify and refine their respective characterizations of the self^. 
Callicles ridicules Socrates' endorsement of self-control, and he proceeds to 
argue why his characterization of the self and code of conduct leads to 
happiness.
How could a man prove to be happy if he’s enslaved to anyone at all: 
Rather, this is what’s admirable and just by nature-and I’ll say it to you 
now with all frankness-that the man who'll live correctly ought to allow 
his own appetites to get as large as possible and not restrain them.
And when they are as large as possible, he ought to be competent to 
devote himself to them by virtue of his bravery and intelligence, and to 
fill them with whatever he may have an appetite for at the 
time...Rather, the truth of it, Socrates-the thing you claim to pursue-is 
like this: wantonness, lack of discipline, and freedom, if available in 
good supply, are excellence and happiness; as for these other things, 
these fancy phrases, these contracts of men that go against nature, 
they're worthless nonsense! (492-c).
Given that happiness is the goal of our active pursuits, Callicles maintains
that we should increase our desires and satiate them by any and all available
^  What I mean by different conceptions of the self has been explained differently by 
others in the literature. For instance, Brickhouse and Smith explain the distinction in 
terms of motivation, though their explanation is tied to the true-self interpretation of 
Socrates; see pp. 97-102.
Plochmann and Robinson characterize the distinction in terms of "two lives,” see 
especially chapters 7-9.
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means, and this will give us the happiness we want. The Calliclean true, ideal 
self consists of uninhibited freedom to satisfy desires, which themselves are 
uncontrolled or not moderated. A person who desires happiness should do 
those things conducive to it, which in this case is the maximization of desire 
and desire satisfaction.
On this model, self-governance is realized in the undisciplined 
procurement of satiating objects, but notice that Callicles is clearly endorsing 
self-govemance by presupposing it as a necessary means to his ideal kind of 
life. He fulfills the motivational requirement through his talk of fostering large 
appetites which will automatically incline a person to seek what will satiate 
them, and such a person's courage will motivate him to obtain them. Callicles 
also meets the epistemic requirement through claiming that a person's 
intelligence will enable him to know what to do to obtain the objects in 
question. The Calliclean model of the ideal self is definitely not egalitarian in 
the sense that all can live their life in the manner suggested above, for that is 
a privilege reserved to the strong by nature, i.e. those who have both the 
psychological capacities and the means necessary to pursue the ideal. 
Nevertheless, for those whom nature has privileged, not only can they each 
govern their lives, but also nature has bestowed upon them the authority to do 
so.
Something surprising occurs with Socrates' critique of Callicles. If 
Schneewind's view of the origin and role of self-govemance is correct, we 
might expect Socrates to brush off Callicles' promotion of self-govemance as
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nonsense and harmful to the possibility of happiness. However, this is not
what happens. Socrates goes through a lengthy argument whereby he
shows that a Calliclean self can never truly be happy because his desires can
never be satiated, mainly because such a person is not really in control of
himself. Such a person is likened to a leaky jar that cannot hold liquid, but
Callicles' presupposition and inclusion of self-governance is not criticized.
Socrates proceeds to construct a picture of how a truly flourishing person
conducts his life, i.e., what type of conduct leads to happiness.
Listen, then, as I pick up the discussion from the beginning. Is the 
pleasant the same as the good?-it isn't, as Callicles and I have 
agreed.-ls the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the 
good for the sake of the pleasant?-The pleasant for the sake of the 
good.-And p/easanf is that by which, when if s come to be present in 
us, we feel pleasure, and good that by which, when ifs present in us, 
we are good?-Thafs right.-But surely we are good, both we and 
everything else thafs good, when some excellence has come to be 
present in us?-Yes, I do think that thafs necessarily so, Callides.-But 
the best way in which the excellence of each thing comes to be 
present in it, whether ifs that of an artifact or of a body or a soul as 
well, or of any animal, is not just any old way, but is due to whatever 
organization, correctness, and craftsmanship is bestowed on each of 
them. Is that right?-Yes, I agree.-So ifs  due to organization that the 
excellence of each thing is something which is organized and has 
order?-Yes, I'd say so.-So also a soul which has its own order is better 
than a disordered one?-Necessarily so.-But surely one that has order 
is an orderly one?-Of course it is.-And an orderly soul is a self­
controlled one?-Absolutely.-So a self-controlled soul is a good 
one...And if [this account] is true, then a person who wants to be 
happy must evidently pursue and practice self-control (506c- 
507;507d).
So, whatever else ethical principles may be, they should direct an 
agent to her good or happiness. Socrates contends that not only does the 
Calliclean model not lead to happiness, but that it has the opposite effect of 
resulting in wretchedness and unhappiness. A person so dominated by
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desire-maximizatîon/satisfaction can never achieve happiness because the
ever-growing desires can never be satiated. Socrates then goes on to
propose his own conception of the ideal self as one who moderates and limits
those desires through self-control. Self-govemance takes on a more active
role in this conception.
This is the target which I think one should look to in living, and in his 
actions he should direct all of his own affairs and those of his city to the 
end that justice and self-control will t)e present in one who is to be 
blessed. He should not allow his appetites to be undisciplined or 
undertake to fill them up-thafs interminably bad-and live the life of a 
marauder (507e).
The Socratic self seems to meet all of the Schneewindian conditions 
set out to allow for self-govemance. A person through understanding what is 
best for him will naturally be motivated to pursue those things. The epistemic 
requirement is met through reason carefully considered what is most 
conducive to flourishing. The motivational requirement is essentially met in 
virtue of two considerations. The eudaimonist conception of the self 
underlying Socrates' view brings to the table a person who is naturally 
motivated to perform those actions directed at the end of happiness. The 
cultivation of self-control strengthens these natural motives so as to enable a 
person to be in a position where he can do those actions judged to be 
appropriate.
For Socrates, then, self-control is conceptually related to self- 
govemance as a necessary condition. An undisciplined and uncontrolled 
individual, like the Calliclean ideal, cannot truly govem himself in that he is led 
about by his appetites and desires. Only through the cultivation of self-control
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can the full exercise of self-govemance take place. This theme of self-control 
as necessary to self-govemance will be repeated and expanded upon in all of 
the thinkers in my history, up to and including Aquinas.
Socrates does not explicitly speak about the authority to self-govern, 
though he does seem to encourage anyone with the capacity to understand 
what is truly good for him to "direct all of his own affairs" (507e) so as to do 
the appropriate actions and seeks the right kind of things. It seems that if 
Socrates is encouraging people to exercise their capacity for self-governance, 
he must think they have the appropriate authority to do so. The upshot of his 
view in the Go/gtas is that even if not everyone can or should govem 
themselves, some people definitely can and should.
ii. Repu6//c I
In Book I of the RepuMc, Socrates expands on his conceptions of 
ethics and self-governance found in the Gorgias. He also refines his 
characterization of eudaimonism, and these refinements pave the way and 
set the standard for virtually all subsequent eudaimonist theories in the pre­
modem tradition. The RepuMc as a whole, and Book I in particular, is 
devoted to an investigation into the nature and benefits of justice. In treating 
Book I as representing Socrates' own thought as distinct from Plato, I am 
following a common developmentalist position which interprets Book I as 
Socratic and the remainder of the RepuMc as properly Platonic.^ However, 
my previous caveat relating to the Gorg/as holds here as well. The main lines
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of my investigation do not hinge on this interpretative assumption regarding 
Plato's works.
In Book I, Socrates' primary interlocutor is Thrasymachus, whose 
theses and arguments embody the spirit of Callicles' positions in the Go/p/as. 
The key point in the debate occurs when Thrasymachus objects to Socrates' 
characterization of justice as something beneficial to the just person. 
Thrasymachus counters Socrates' suggestion by labeling justice another's 
good, in the sense that the benefits of justice fall not to the just, but to another 
taking advantage of the near-sightedness of the just. Socrates proceeds to 
argue that justice really does bestow benefits on the just and is good in the 
eudaimonistic sense.
. In the Gorg/as, Socrates countered Callicles' ethical theory not by 
attacking the notion of self-govemance that underpinned Callides' account. 
Rather, Socrates argued that Callicles theory suffered in that it did not lead to 
flourishing on account of its undisdplined approach to the appetites.
Socrates proposed his own account, which not only included self-govemance, 
but gave to such govemance a more active role than Callicles had given to it. 
We find Socrates making even more surprising claims (surprising, at least, if 
Schneewind's view were correct) about self-govemance in the Repub/*c Book 
I.
As we have seen, one driving motif in Socratic eudaimonism is the 
emphatic endorsement it gives to rational self-control. A second such theme 
in Socratic eudaimonism is the nature and role of a soul's function as
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developed in Socrates' response to Thrasymachus. Socrates develops his
idea of the soul's function within the context of his defense of justice against
Thrasymachus' assault.
Socrates: Now, I think you'll understand what I was asking earlier 
when I asked whether the function of each thing is what it alone can do 
or what it does better than anything else.
Thrasymachus: I understand, and I think that this is the function of 
each.
Socrates: All right. Does each thing to which a particular function is 
assigned eUso have a virtue? Lefs go over the same ground again.
We say that eyes have some function?
Thrasymachus: They do.
Socrates: So there is also a virtue of eyes?...And could eyes perform 
their function well if they lacked their peculiar virtue and had the vice 
instead?
Thrasymachus: How could they, for don't you mean if they had 
blindness instead of sight?
Socrates: Whatever their virtue is, for I'm not now asking about that 
but about whether anything that has a function performs it well by 
means of its own peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice? 
Thrasymachus: Thafs true it does...
Socrates: Come, then, and lefs consider this: Is there some function
of the soul that you couldn’t perform with anything else, for example, 
taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there 
anything other than a soul to which you could rightly assign these, and 
say that they are its peculiar function?
Thrasymachus: No, none of them.
Socrates: What of living? Isn't that a function of a soul? 
Thrasymachus: It certainly is.
Socrates: And don't we say that there is a virtue of a soul? 
Thrasymachus: We do.
Socrates: Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, 
Thrasymachus, if it is deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that 
impossible?
Thrasymachus: Ifs impossible.
Socrates: Doesn't it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care 
of things badly and that a good soul does all these things well?...Now 
we agreed that justice is a soul's virtue, and injustice its vice?...Then, it 
follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an unjust one 
badly (353b-e).^'*
24 Plato. RepuMc.
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Just as the function of an eye is to see, and that an eye that sees well 
is a good eye, so a person who manages her life well, i.e. justly, is a 
good/happy person. Socrates ties the function argument into his praise of 
self-control, self-mastery, and self-govemance. He states, "Is there some 
function of a soul that you couldn't perform with anything else, for example, 
taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like?" Ruling over other 
desires and impulses is part of the soul's function. Notice that these remarks 
about a person's function further refines Socrates' model of the self. What it 
is to be a self consists in the very activity of governing, both in the sense of 
one mastering his own desires and emotions and in the sense of directing his 
own affairs and actions.
In other words, what is unique about a soul, what "it alone can do or 
what it does better than anything else," is the very activity of ruling itself 
through deliberation about what actions would be most appropriate and being 
able to perform such actions in virtue of cultivated appetites and desires that 
do not interfere with their execution. Deliberation about what to do satisfies 
the epistemic requirement for self-govemance, where self-control and the 
ability to take care of things demonstrates that a person is able to motivate 
himself to do what is appropriate. Given that doing all of these things well, 
i.e., through justice, is what constitutes, or at least chiefly contributes to 
euda/mon/a, and euda/mor7/a is what Socrates is promoting that people seek, 
it seems to follow that he is granting that people, in virtue of possessing a 
function, have the necessary authority to govem themselves.
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This seems to be a significant development relative to his position in 
the Gorp/as. For there, he encouraged active self-govemance for the sake of 
flourishing. Now, with the function argument, the very defining feature of a 
person or self is essenticUly self-govemance. Both his endorsement of self- 
govemance in the Go/p/as and his recognition that the capacities for self- 
govemance constitute a soul's unique properties and thereby determine its 
function in the RepuMc I represent strong evidence against the considered 
theses of Schneewind. The function argument ends Book I, setting up Plato's 
extended arguments in the remainder of the Repub/zc.
2.3: Plato
Socrates' interlocutors remain unconvinced and unsatisfied by his concluding 
arguments against Thrasymachus. As a result, they restate in strengthened 
form objections to his view conceming the beneficial nature of justice and 
request a stronger defense-a request he grants. The remaining nine books of 
the Republic represent Plato’s own development of the issues in question. In 
the course of his characterization of the nature of justice and defense of its 
benefits, Plato presents a view of self-govemance in some ways distinct from 
that of Socrates'. However, at no point does he abandon the notion as 
unimportant, and in the end, it plays a crucial role in his overall account,
i. The Nature and Role of Justice 
I wish to summarize Plato's main argument in the Repub/zc (most 
notably Books II, IV, and VIII) to the extent necessary to give adequate
38
context for the remainder of my investigation and interpretation of Plato's 
ethical theory.
The argument begins with a restatement of the eudaimonistic 
framework that sets the terms and standards for the ensuing analysis. The 
framework dictates that if Plato is to show that justice is truly beneficial and 
good, then he must demonstrate that justice is conducive to flourishing 
inherently, and not just occasionally in virtue of its consequences. Accepting 
these terms, Plato's mouthpiece Socrates proceeds first to determine the 
nature of justice. The manner in which he accomplishes this task is to 
discern justice on a large scale-namely in a good city/political arrangement- 
and then to judge by analogy the nature of justice in an individual person.
Plato begins the construction of the city by setting forth its basic parts- 
in this case, three classes of people. These three classes are the rulers, the 
soldiers or guardians, and the workers. The best city, the one with the best 
constitution, instantiates the four virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and 
justice. Plato seeks to discover the nature of justice by finding its place in the 
city, and to do this he first determines where the other virtues reside.
Through a process of setting aside the properties of the non-justice virtues, 
whatever remains relevant to virtue will pertain to justice. Wisdom is found in 
the good judgment of the rulers. Courage is located in the spirited protection 
offered by the soldiers. Moderation is spread throughout the city as each 
class and each member accept who ought to rule the city. What remains is
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the order and harmony produced by each part and each person doing her
own work and not interfering with the proper work of others, and this is justice.
What pertains to the city on a large-scale pertains to the individual on a
smaller scale. The task of determining the nature of justice in the individual
amounts to finding the analogues between city and person and using the
model of the good city to elucidate the nature of a good person, including his
requisite virtues. Plato goes on to distinguish, classify, and describe three
parts of the person or soul: the rational (the deliberative and judging part),
spirited (the fighting part), and appetitive (the food, drink, sex, etc. desiring
part). I want to discuss one of his arguments conceming the virtue of
moderation and its relation to his parts of the soul theory.
In the Gorg/as, we find Socrates praising self-control and arguing that it
allows us to direct our lives as we see fit, as opposed to being led about by
various desires. Self-control performs an equally important and similar role in
Plato’s account in the Republic as well. He looks to analyze and articulate
the conditions that make self-control possible. He then uses this account as
evidence in favor of distinct parts of the soul.
Moderation is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of 
pleasures and desires. People indicate as much when they use the 
phrase "self-control" and other similar phrases. I don't know just what 
they mean by them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that 
moderation has left behind in language...Yet isn't the expression "self- 
control" ridiculous? The stronger self that does the controlling is the 
same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is 
referred to in all such expressions...Nonetheless, the expression is 
apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of that very person, there 
is a better part and a worse one and that, whenever the naturally better 
part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by saying that the 
person is self-controlled or master of himself (430e-431).
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Like Socrates before him, Plato devotes considerable time to the 
notion of self-control (sophmsune .^ On his own account, a self-controlled 
person is one in whom the rational part effectively rules over the spirited and 
appetitive parts. As might be guessed, this notion of self-control will factor 
into my exposition of other Platonic notions. Plato completes his city- 
individual analogy by.describing the just person as one in whom reason rules, 
the spirited part seeks honor in submission to reason, and the appetites 
desire necessary things for bodily well-being in an appropriate way.
ii. Five Types of Constitutions/lndividuais 
Plato's extended views on the nature of self-govemance and the 
conditions allowing for it are best represented in Book VIII and the very 
beginning of IX. Here he maps the degeneration of the best type of 
city/individual to the worst type. ‘Then, if there are five forms of city, there 
must also be five forms of the individual soul” (544e). I am interpreting him to 
be offering five general characterization of the self, in this case five different 
types of individuals with varying degrees of psychological capacities. The self 
can be characterized in multiple ways for Plato because the parts of the self 
can relate to one another in different ways. The distinct types of souls or 
selves are going to be characterized in terms of arrangement of its parts.
One important point to note is that the person or self is not reducible to 
one part, or vice versa. What it is to be an individual is to be composed of
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these parts.^ Plato conducts his analysis by first considering the political 
constitution and then focusing on the corresponding individual type. He 
begins with the best constitution, i.e. the one which embodies justice most 
fully-kingship or aristocracy, and then discusses, in order of increasing 
degeneracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.
The best city is the aristocratic city that Socrates had constructed in his 
exploration of the nature of justice. All of the virtues are embodied in this city, 
where the rulers rule wisely, the guardians protect courageously, each part 
accepts its proper role producing moderation, and each part does its own 
work, thereby effecting justice. The best individual, then, is one in whom 
reason delit)erates and judges wisely, the impulses of the spirit serve reason, 
and the appetitive desires serve reason and promote txxfily well-being.
The aristocratic individual both has the most robust capacities for self- 
govemance and performs such govemance in the way most conducive to 
flourishing. With regard to the epistemic requirement, he has access to moral 
standards in virtue of good upbringing, education, and resultant knowledge. 
His complete self-control enables him to allow the appropriate desires and 
emotions of the non-rational parts of the soul to motivate himself to do what 
he chooses to do, or at least, such desires and emotions do not interfere with 
the process of action performance. In other words, the lower emotions and 
desires to not interfere and frustrate the rational part's planning and judgment 
on how best to govem. I will address the issue of a person's right to govern
^  For a helpful discussion on issues surrounding the relation of the parts of the soul 
to the person herself, see Annas especially chapter 5, section 3.
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herself in further detail subsequent to my exposition on the four other types of 
constitutions/individuals. But at this point what is clear is that the full 
possession of the psychological capacities and their proper ordering through 
self-control grants to a person the proper authority to exercise self- 
governance. Hence, the aristocratic individual fully possesses the ability to 
govem himself, and he has the right to do so.
The aristocratic individual comprises, from Plato, a very convincing 
piece of evidence against Schneewind's contentions that self-govemance 
was not present or central to moral theory prior to the modern era. The 
aristocratic individual is offered by Plato as the ideal of ethical achievement. 
Such an individual is fully flourishing and ethically excellent through the self- 
govemance of her life by means of knowledge of the good and an ordered 
soul. The remaining four constitution/individual types provide a very visual, 
detailed, and insightful analysis of the dependency relationship that self- 
govemance has with the relevant psychological capacities and how such 
capacities can be corrupted, thus negatively affecting the possibility of self- 
govemance. I believe this analysis by Plato definitely represents the most 
original, systematic, and engaging investigation into self-govemance and its 
necessary components of the ancient period and most likely of the modem 
period as well.
The first degenerate political arrangement is timocracy. Timocracy is 
characterized as a city where the guardian class claims hegemony and forces 
the now puppet ruling class and worker class to serve the aim of military
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victory and honor. Plato characterizes the corresponding timocratic individual 
as conflicted, but not divided. His rational part is still well-educated and 
knowledgeable, but circumstances have enabled his spirited and appetitive 
parts to grow too strong. To mediate the conflict, he allows the spirited part to 
rule.
The timocratic individual is still capable of some self-govemance. His 
developed rational part enables him to possess sufficient knowledge of moral 
standards for the task, and therefore, he satisfies the epistemic requirement. 
However, his excessively developed spirit interferes with and undermines his 
ability to motivate himself properly to do what reason counsels, thus stunting, 
but not eliminating, his motivational capacities. In other words, his capacities 
for self-govemance are still present, but much diminished relative to the 
aristocratic person.
Next in line is oligarchy, where citizenship and political authority are 
based primarily on property/wealth holdings. Since wealth translates into 
political power, the rulers of this city seek above all else money. Plato 
presents an oligarchy as a city divided or tom between the rich and poor, 
where the latter rebels against the former, and in turn the former suppresses 
the latter. The oligarchic individual is construed as one who allows one 
appetite, namely the desire for money, to rule over all other appetites and the 
other parts of the soul. Reason and the spirit are placed in the service of 
money-making, while the remaining lower desires are suppressed. This leads 
to an unstable equilibrium where conflict brims. Plato states.
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And doesn't this make it clear that, in those other contractual 
obligations, where he as a good reputation and is thought to be just, 
he's forcibly holding his other evil appetites in check by means of some 
decent part of himself? He holds them in check, not by persuading 
them that it's better not to act on them or taming then with arguments, 
but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possess ions...Then 
someone like that wouldn't be entirely free from internal civil war and 
wouldn't t)e one but in some way two, though generally his better 
desires are in control of the worse...For this reason, he'd be more 
respectable than many, but the true virtue of a single-minded and 
harmonious soul far escape him (554d-e).
This type of self is even less capable of governing itself than the
timocratic individual. His epistemic access to moral standards is much more
limited compared to the timocratic person. So, while he has some knowledge
of what is appropriate, he lacks such knowledge in other areas. Hence, he is
ill-equipped from an epistemic point of view to know what he should do in a
fair numt)6r of situations. Moreover, his perpetual suppression of the spirited
part and fear of the other appetitive desires cripples his ability to motivate
himself in matters other than those relating to the acquisition of money. Even
in cases where he does have the knowledge necessary to know what course
of action should be taken, it is probable that he will be unable to initiate such
action.
Next is the democratic city. Socrates, tongue-in-cheek, offers a
detailed look at such a city.
First of all, then, aren't they free? And isn't the city full of freedom and 
freedom of speech? And doesn't everyone in it have the license to do 
what he wants?...In this city, there is no requirement to rule, even if 
you're capable of it, or again to be ruled if you don't want to be...And 
what about the city's tolerance? Isn't it so completely lacking in small- 
mindedness that it utterly despises the things we took so seriously 
when we were founding our city, namely, that unless someone had 
transcendent natural gifts, he'd never become good unless he played
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the right games and followed a fine way of life from early childhood? 
Isn't it magnificent the way it tramples all this underfoot, by giving no 
thought to what someone was doing before he entered public life and 
by honoring him if only he tells then that he wishes the majority 
well?...Then these and other like them are the characteristics of 
democracy. And it would seem to be a pleasant constitution, which 
lacks rulers but not variety and which distributes a sort of equality to 
both equals and unequals alike (557b-558c).
The city is ruled by all, including the workers and tradesmen, and
consequently, it is ruled by no one person or group of persons who have the
knowledge to rule wisely. All people have an equal voice and authority in
matters of public policy and the like. The democratic individual lives at the
whim of his appetitive desires. All of these desires are given equal
considerations of importance, and his life is directed by the given desire
prompting his activity at that particular moment. "And so he lives on, yielding
day by day to the desire at hand" (561c).
Plato seems to be presenting a sophisticated analysis of the Calliclean
ideal self (an analysis that continues though the discussing of tyranny).
Recall that Callicles advocated a life of uninhibited desires. Plato, like
Socrates of the Go/p/as, wishes to say that on such a conception (the
Calliclean and democratic person), self-governance is an illusion. A
democratic individual cannot truly govern himself because his rational part
has no substantive awareness of moral standards, and even if it did, his
appetitive desires are so potent that they prompt him to do what they dictate,
over and above any other consideration.
And so he lives, always surrendering rule over himself to whichever 
desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is
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satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but 
satisfying them all equally (561b).
In essence, the individual is a slave to his lower desires, which brings us t)ack
to the importance of self-control for this tradition. It is because the individual
lacks self-control that he is unable to effectively self-govem.
Plato seems to be suggesting that the complete lack of self-control
goes hand in hand with a lack of knowledge of appropriate moral standards.
Part of this is due to his theory of education and upbringing, where the good
person would have learned and practiced self-control along with leaming
about what is good. Another element though, seems to be that the
undisciplined life where the appetites are in charge leads to an obfuscation of
whatever moral knowledge is present. The dynamic seems to be that the
undisciplined person, in virtue of a lack of self-control, is not attentive to this
knowledge, and the knowledge is thus useless. Due to this, there is a sort of
double necessity of self-control to self-governance. If a person is
undisciplined, then there is a failure to meet the motivational requirement, but
also there is a failure to meet the epistemic requirement in virtue of some
knowledge never learned and other knowledge that is ignored.
Plato completes his analysis with a consideration of tyranny. A tyranny
is the rule by one person, similar to a kingship in this respect. Unlike a
kingship, however, the tyrant is a person from the working class who has
seized power. He has no wisdom, no sense of the common good, and he
achieves his political aims through violence, murder, and oppression. In
effect, he reduces all citizens to slaves. The corresponding tyrannical
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individual is characterized as having one "lawless" appetitive desire rule over 
all others. Plato identifies erotic love or lust as this dictatorial desire. Annas 
offers a brief explanation concerning the connection of lust and tyranny that is 
very illuminating.
Plato is pressing the idea that the tyrant's soul must be dominated by a 
kind of motivation that has not only no conception of the good of the 
whole, but no real notion of the whole self. He chooses lust, 
presumably, as being the archetypical motivation that is wholly fixed on 
getting its object and is in itself indifferent to the other factors in the 
soul and their interdependent satisfactions.^ ^
Whether erotic love actually motivates in this way is beside the point,
as long as Plato believes that it motivates in this, or some similar, manner.
The desire of lust, when it becomes, in a Calliclean turn of phrase, "as large
as possible" (573b), tyrannizes over all the other parts and desires of the soul,
such that none of them can be satisfied. The possibility of true self-
governance, as with the democratic person, is simply eliminated. The rational
part is dominated to the point of being useless with respect to moral
standards, and all motivational abilities are in the sole service of lust. The
person cannot govern herself on account of her lustful desire ruling over her.
With respect to the issue of one's right to rule herself relevant to all five
types of individuals, Plato maintains that if one has the full capacities
necessary for self-governance, then she should exercise those capacities.
On his view a non-egalitarian standard is in place for determining who has the
proper authority to govern themselves, since the standard is determined by
26 Annas, pp. 303-304.
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each person's ability for such activity. Plato makes this standard clear in the
following passage.
Now, one finds all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures, and pains, 
mostly in children, women, household slaves, and in those of the 
inferior majority who are called free...But you meet with the desires 
that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in accordance 
with understanding and correct belief only in the few people who are 
born with the best natures and receive the best education...Then, don't 
you see that in your city, too, the desires of the inferior many are 
controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few? (431 c-d).
The rulers govern themselves and others in virtue of their knowledge
and appropriate motivational structure. The other members of the city lack
one or both of these capacities and therefore are not allowed to try to govern
themselves. Plato elaborates on the nature of a society that does adhere to
an egalitarian self-governance ideal in his description of the democratic city.
However, as already noted, he also views this arrangement to be severely
degenerate because such citizens lack the capacity to govern themselves
and others in any significant sense.
Plato is affirming the principle that if a person fully possesses the
requisite psychological capacities, then he has the proper authority to
exercise self-governance. Moreover, Plato's initial strategy in Book II was to
begin with the ideal city/individual and discover the necessary features of
both. The ideal moral agent had the proper authority from the start, with the
psychological conditions being the necessary conditions for that authority.
Hence Plato also affirms the principle that if a person has proper authority to
exercise self-governance, then they fully possess the requisite psychological
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capacities. From this the following principle follows, which I call the Platonic 
biconditional:
Fully possessing psychological capacities requisite for self- 
governance is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
possessing the proper authority to exercise self-governance.
The only caveat to this principle, for Plato, is that to fully possess the relevant
psychological capacities, it seems that a person (unless he has "transcendent
natural gifts" (558b)) must have had the proper education and upbringing that
instills self-control and other such disciplines into him. That is why self-
control remains a necessary condition, for Plato, to the practice of self-
governance.
Plato is explicitly non-egalitarian in holding that some individuals, 
namely the oligarchic, timocratic, democratic, and tyrannical, should not, 
either by degree or all together, govern themselves. Nevertheless, the notion 
of self-governance plays a pivotal role in his overall theory as a  constituent of 
the aristocratic ruling class and those individuals whose rational part rules 
over the spirited and appetitive parts. His appraisal and praise of self- 
govemance and his robust analysis of the necessary conditions for the 
exercise of self-governance provide a rich contribution to the understanding of 
the nature and role self-governance may have in moral theory.
2.4: Aristotle
Aristotle most fully develops his account of self-governance in his 
Mcomachearr Efh/cs. Like Socrates and Plato before him, he spends
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considerable time and thought treating the nature, cultivation, and exercise of 
the psychological abilities relevant to the activity of self-governance. In fact, 
most of the previously considered themes reappear in Aristotle.
I. fV/cAomacAean EfA/cs
Aristotle begins his /V/comachean Efh/cs by accepting the eudaimonist
framework as the proper mode for an ethical inquiry. Human beings want the
best good, that is, they desire to live well/be happy. The practical end of
investigating the nature of ethics, and by extension politics, is to discover
those objects, states, and activities that will best enable us to achieve this
goal of happiness. Aristotle echoes Socrates with his method for determining
what the best good actually consists in.
Perhaps, then, we shall find this if we first grasp the function of a 
human being. For just as the good, i.e., [doing] well, for a fleiutist, a 
sculptor, and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a 
function and [characteristic] action, seem s to depend on its function, 
the sam e seem s to be true for a  human being, if a  human being has 
som e function...W hat, then, could this [function] be? For living is 
apparently shared with plants, but what we are looking for is the 
special function of a human being; hence we should set aside the life 
of nutrition and growth. The life next in order is some sort of life of 
sense perception, but this too is apparently shared with horse, ox, and 
every animal. The remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of 
action of the [part of the soul] that has reason. O ne [part] of it has 
reason as obeying reason; the other has it as itself having reason and 
thinking. Moreover, life is also spoken of in two ways [as capacity and 
as activity], and we must take [a human being's special function to t)e] 
life as activity, since this seems to be called life more fully. We have 
found, then that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with 
reason or requiring reason (I, 7 ,1 097b-1098a).
Just as Socrates t)elieves the nature of happiness and what is conducive to it
is defined in terms of the individual soul's function, so Aristotle insists that if
27 Aristotle, Mcomachean Efh/cs.
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the human being has a function (characteristic activity), that function will
determine wherein happiness lies. For Aristotle, human beings do in fact
have a function, which he characterizes as "activity of the soul in accord with
reason or requiring reason." The human being is good/happy if he performs
this function well, otherwise he is not happy. The function is performed well if
it is completed though the virtue or virtues proper to such activity.
Though not identical to Socrates' characterization of the soul's function
as "taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like," Aristotle's
conception is very similar, especially in that it places a great deal of emphasis
on the soul/person performing an activity and doing so in a certain way. Also
of interest is that Aristotle distinguishes between two broad parts of the soul.
One of the parts contains reason, while the other part does not possess
reason inherently, but it is capable of obeying reason, and thereby can
become rational through participation in the rational part.
Since reason and deliberation possess such a central role in his
theory, Aristotle gives a detailed and technical account of the nature of
reason, deliberation, and action in Book III. Here, he outlines the process by
which deliberation, choice, and action is voluntary.
As we have said, then, a human being would seem to be a principle of 
action. Deliberation is about the actions he can do, and actions are for 
the sake of other things; hence we deliberate about things that 
promote an end, not about the end...What we deliberation about is the 
same as what we decide to do, it is definite; for what we decide to do is 
what we have judged [to be right] as a result of delit)eration. We have 
found, then, that what we decide to do is whatever action, among 
those up to us, we deliberate atx)ut and [consequently] desire to do. 
Hence also decision will be up to us; for when we have judged [that it
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is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with our 
wish (111,3, 1112b-1113a).
Aristotle is outlining the process by which the activity of self-governance is
possible. Each human being is the efficient cause of the action he performs.
The ability of deliberation allows a person to sort through the possible courses
of action in order to discern which course would be most conducive to the end
of euda/mon/a; whatever that course of action is, it is classified as right. The
agent then makes a judgment that the considered possibility is the right one,
which is the decision. Aristotle notes that once this judgment has been made,
there is a natural desire to do whatever action is decided. This brings us to
the consideration of issues concerning motivation.
For Aristotle, sources of motivation lie in the nonrational part of the
soul. However, this does not mean they are completely outside the control of
an individual or that they are wholly nonrational.
The nonrational [part], then, as well [as the whole soul] apparently has 
two parts. For while the plantlike [part] shares in reason not at all, the 
[part] with appetites and in general desires shares in reason in a way, 
insofar as it both listens to reason and obeys it. This is the way in 
which we are said to "listen to reason' from father or friends, as 
opposed to the way in which [we "give the reason"] in mathematics.
The nonrational part also [obeys and] is persuaded in some way by 
reason, as is shown by correction and by every sort of reproof and 
exhortation. If, then, we ought to say that this [part] also has reason, 
then the [part] that has reason, as well [as the nonrational part], will 
have two parts. One with reason fully, by having it within itself; the 
other will have reason by listening to reason as to a father (1,13, 
1102b-1103a).
The connection to motivation is that the nonrational part of the soul, 
which includes the emotions and other factors that contribute to act- 
motivation, can come under the influence and direction of reason. The
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rational part has the capacity to habituate the emotions of the non-rational 
part to follow its lead. So, once a decision is made, there is an accompanying 
desire that ideally prompts the appropriate action. However, because the 
desires are not inherently rational, they may not automatically prompt in a 
way consonant with judgment. That is why the emotions and desires must be 
made to come under the sway of reason. Aristotle proposes that the moral 
virtues can be cultivated to achieve this task, especially the virtues of bravery 
and temperance/moderation (sophrosune ,^ since "bravery and temperance 
seem to be the virtues of the nonrational parts" (III, 10,1117b).
Bravery concerns finding the rational mean conceming the feelings of 
fear, while temperance (self-control) moderates desires conceming bodily- 
pleasurable things. For instance, describing the temperate person, Aristotle 
states.
The temperate person has an intermediate state in relation to these 
[bodily pleasures]. For he finds no pleasure in what most pleases the 
intemperate person, but finds it disagreeable; he finds no pleasure at 
all in the wrong things. He finds no intense pleasure in any [bodily 
pleasures], suffers no pain at their absence, and has no appetite for 
them, or only a moderate appetite, not to the wrong degree or at the 
wrong time or anything else at all of that sort. If something is pleasant 
and conducive to health or fitness, he will desire this moderately and in 
the right way; and he will desire in the same way anything else that is 
pleasant, if it is no obstacle to health and fitness, does not deviate from 
the fine, and does not exceed his means. For the opposite sort of 
person likes these pleasures more than they are worth; that is not the 
temperate person's character, but he likes them as correct reason 
prescribes (III, 1 2 ,1119a).
The moral virtues and their accompanying motivation are acquired through
choice. Aristotle's view is that over time, through discrete choices, we
habituate ourselves in virtue of our emotions, which underpin motivation, to
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act in certain characteristic ways. In this way, all of right types of motivation
of sufficient action-prompting intensity are acquirable.
At this point in the overview, we see that Aristotle believes that at least
some human beings have the adequate motivational capacity within
themselves to allow them to initiate self-action, without the external threat of
punishment or promise of reward. With this sophisticated analysis of the
capacities relevant to deliberation and motivation, Aristotle fulfills the
motivational requirement for self-governance.
Aristotle's proceeds to give an account of the intellectual virtue that
directly concerns deliberation, namely, prudence (phmnes/s/
It seem s proper to a prudent person to be able to deliberate finely 
about things that are good and beneficial for himself, not about some 
restricted area-about what sorts of things promote health or strength, 
for instance-but about what sorts of things promote living well in 
general...prudence is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, 
concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a  human 
being (VI, 5, 1140a-1140b)...Prudence, by contrast, is about human 
concerns, about things open to deliberation. For we say that 
deliberating well is the function of the prudent person more than 
anyone else, but no one deliberates about things that cannot be 
otherwise, or about things lacking any goal that is a good achievable in 
action. The unqualifiedly good deliberator is the one whose aim 
accords with rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a 
human being that is achievable in action (VI, 7 ,1141b).
A person who deliberates well is one who has epistemic access to
moral standards, i.e., principles about what are good or bad for a human
being, and consequently, in virtue of this knowledge, is able to act in a way
conducive to his flourishing. Such a person fulfills the epistemic requirement.
The psychological conditions are thus met for self-governance. More to the
point, though, is the importance that Aristotle seems to place on the role of
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self-governance. The eudaimonist self desires to flourish and therefore 
desires those things that are conducive to that end. What it is to flourish is in 
large part to govern and rule oneself by deliberating about what to do and 
then motivating oneself to performing the selected option.
I am not alone in interpreting Aristotle as promoting a strong 
conception of self-governance. For instance, Fred Miller argues to this same 
conclusion regarding the interpretation of Aristotle's moral theory in his article 
"Aristotelian Autonomy," where he frequently contrasts Aristotle's conception 
of autonomy (self-governance) with that of Kanf s, as he does in the following 
passage.
The Aristotelian moral agent is self-directed and governed by reason, 
but Aristotle does not view the rule of reason as consisting in self- 
legislation, that is, the making and enacting of universal moral laws on 
the basis of our pure practical reason alone. For Kant, reason is in 
itself “a  higher faculty of desire,” and it is able to motivate us to obey 
our moral duty without relying on any prior desires. For Aristotle, in 
contrast, human beings have natural ends such as health and 
happiness, and when the agent apprehends these through reason he 
has a natural appetite for them.^
Aristotle goes to great length to explain the nature and role of self-govemance
in the good person's life and the psychological capacities necessary for
engaging in self-rule.
Next, we must examine the issue of who has a justified claim to
actually exercise the ability of self-rule. To do this, we must turn to some
considerations in Aristotle's political theory. His theory of self-govemance,
like Plato's before him, lacks an egalitarian dimension, in both the allotment of
necessary psychological capacities and in the recognition of one's right to
28 Miller, 2002.
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govern oneself.^ His views on the social nature of human beings and the
nature of political organization further expose and explain the dimension of
this inequality in his overall ethical theory. Moreover, his political theory
presents a bit of a puzzle on the issue of the connection between the
possession of psychological capacities and the authority to self-govem, which
I need to address.
II. Political Concerns and TTre Po/Wcs
Early in the A/zcomachean Efh/cs, Aristotle inquires into some of the
constitutive features of the best human good. He observes that such a good
would be self-sufficient in that it would lack nothing necessary for happiness.
In this context, he makes the following remark.
The same conclusion [that happiness is complete] also appears to 
follow from self-sufficiency. For the complete good seems to be self- 
sufficient. What we count as self-sufficient is not what suffices for a
solitary person by himself, living an isolated life, but what suffices also 
for parents, children, wife, and, in general, for friends and fellow
citizens, since a human being is a naturally political [animal] (1,7, 
1097b).
This passage expresses two significant points. Human happiness, by nature, 
includes a social and political dimension, and the very nature of human 
selfhood includes a political component. In other words, what it is to be a 
human person is to be social in some way.^
^  In both the article cited above and in his A/afure, Jusf/ce, and ;n Adstot/a^ 
Po/zdcs, Miller seems a little too optimistic about the issue of egalitarian rights 
recognized by Aristotle.
^  Kullman recognizes the importance of Aristotle's attribution of political to human 
selfhood when he comments a similar passage in The Po/rfzcs. "the statement 
undoubtedly has an important place within the entire anthropology of Aristotle; it is 
not merely interesbng from the point of view of the participation of man in daily 
politics," p. 95.
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Aristotle offers further details on tfie nature of political selfhood when
he discusses the relationship between the individual and state. In this context
he notes the following asymmetry.
Furthermore, the state has a natural priority over the household and 
over any individual among us. For the whole must be prior to the part. 
Separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they will not longer be 
hand and foot except in name, as one might speak of a 'hand' or foof 
sculptured in stone. That will be the condition of the spoilt hand, which 
no longer has the capacity and tfie function which define it. So, though 
we may say they have the same names, we cannot say that they are, 
in that condition, the same things. It is clear then that the state is tx)th 
natural and prior to the individual. For if an individual is not fully self- 
sufficient after separation, he will stand in the same relationship to the 
whole as the parts in the other case do. Whatever is incapable of 
participating in the association which we call the state, a dumb animal 
for example, and equally whatever is perfectly self-sufficient and has 
no need to (e.g. a god) is not a part of the state at all (I, ii, 1253a18).^ ^
C.C.W. Taylor offers an informative analysis on the meaning of Aristotle’s
characterization of a human being as a political animal and the state's natural
priority over the individual, including the hand to body-individual to state
analogy.
Aristotle makes analogous claims about the relation between individual 
and polis; an individual incapable of membership of a polls is not, 
strictly speaking, a human being, but rather a (non-human) animal, 
while one who is self-sufficient apart from the po//s is superhuman, or, 
as Aristotle puts it, a god. His point is not the uncontentious one that 
one cannot be a wicket-keeper (as opposed to a former, or a potential, 
wicket-keeper) except as a member of a cricket team. It is the stronger 
point that one cannot be a human being except in the context of a 
po//s. The context need not be actual; so Robinson Crusoe does not 
cease to be human during the period of his total isolation. But 
nevertheless the analogy commits Aristotle to holding that what makes 
any of us human is our capacity for po//s membership.^
31
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Taylor, p. 239.
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Connecting this to self-govemance, recall that my position is that the
notion of self-govemance can be best understood only in terms of the
conception of the person or self underpinning it. Aristotle's conception is that
of a eudaimonist and political self. That is, the self is something that desires
happiness, and the things in accordance with it, but in virtue of being a
political self, happiness can only be properly realized in some sort of social or
political community. The natural priority of the state over the individual does
not immediately affect the exercise of self-govemance in a significant manner.
For Aristotle still maintains that citizens, especially the best citizens will
achieve flourishing by self-directing their activity to their own good and the
good of the state, which ultimately turns out to be the sam e overall good.
However, a combination of Aristotle's view on natural inequalities of
psychological capacities and abilities and the way in which he construes the
priority of the state over the individual leads to the denial that all people
possess a legitimate claim or right to govern them selves. This denial is either
total or limited, depending on certain factors.
In the passage below, Taylor offers a summary of Aristotle's view on
the principles determining the organization of the household, principles which
also obtain for the organization of the state.
Household management involves the rule of the developed practical 
wisdom of the patriarch over slaves, females, and children, all types of 
human beings who, in Aristotle's view, lack that developed wisdom;
Ihe slave does not have the faculty of deliberation, the female has it, 
but in a form lacking authority, and the child has it, but in an incomplete 
form" (1260a12-14). Since that deficiency makes them unable to
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provide adequately for their own lives...they must make good the 
deficiency by dependence on the wisdom of the patriarch.^
In this passage, Aristotle simply reiterates Plato's view that if a person
lacks the appropriate capacities, he lacks the authority to govern himself.
This view in and of itself seems to be unproblematic. However, further
comments by Aristotle slightly confuse the matter. Regarding the
organization of the state, Aristotle advocates a type of limited democracy
where the citizens, men who are not foreigners or slaves, take turns making
the political decisions. In this system, these citizens have the right to direct
their own activity to their own good. However, Aristotle recognizes that his
principles of unequal capacities and priority of state theoretically commit him
to maintaining that if an eminently wise group of rulers were to exist, then
even the well-educated men, i.e., the full citizens of the democracy, would
forfeit their right to rule in deference to the wise men.
Since every association of persons forming a  state consists of rulers 
and ruled, w e must ask whether those who rule and those who are  
ruled ought to be different persons or the same throughout life; for the 
education which will be needed will depend upon which way we make 
this distinction. If one group of persons w ere far superior to all the rest 
as we believe gods and heroes to be superior to men, and if they had 
both bodies and souls of such outstanding quality that the superiority of 
the rulers were indisputable and evident to those ruled by them, then it 
would obviously be better that the same set of persons should always 
rule and the others always be ruled, once and for all. But since this is 
not a condition that can easily be obtained, and since rulers are not so 
greatly superior to their subjects as Scylax says the kings are in India, 
it is clear that, for a variety of reasons, all must share alike in the 
business of ruling and being ruled by turns (VII, xiv, 1332b12).
The apparent puzzle here is that the authority to self-govem might be
interpreted to be relative not simply to one's own psychological capacities, but
33 Taylor, p. 245.
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also relative to the capacities of others. So the situation might obtain where 
one day person x has the proper authority to rule himself in virtue of his 
abilities, but the next day, due to the arrival of others far superior to him, he 
loses his authority. I need to untangle several issues here.
It is not clear in Aristotle that being politically ruled by another 
precludes all self-governance on the part of the citizen. So, where he is clear 
that children, women, and slaves actually lack the abilities necessary for self- 
rule and therefore are in need of being governed by another, both politically 
and othenwise, it does not follow that political rule on the part of another 
prevents self-governance. In fact, based on Aristotle's description of 
democracy of citizens of equal capacities taking turns ruling and being ruled, 
it seems that he does think self-govemance as outlined in his A/Zcomachean 
Ethics can and should occur in both situations.
For the sake of argument, though, I will grant that being ruled by 
another in a strong political sense, especially if one is ruled for life by another, 
does preclude the possession of proper authority to self-govem. Even if this 
is so, strictly speaking, Aristotle does not seem to violate the Platonic 
biconditional (a principle, I t)elieve, he accepts), which states, fully possessing 
psychological capacities requisite for self-govemance is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for possessing the proper authority to exercise self- 
governance. The reason for this is that for Aristotle, only that group of far 
superior humans would fully possess psychological capacities requisite for 
self-govemance. In the absence of such individuals, the group of people
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whose psychological capacities are second best become top dog, and 
therefore possess rightful authority to self-govern, although the right would 
not be inalienable.
The remaining difficulty pertains to the role of the virtues. Aristotle's 
account in the A/fComachear? Efh/cs contends that what fully actualizes a 
person's psychological capacities are the virtues relevant to each capacity. 
So, for instance, to possess fully the intellectual psychological capacity 
pertaining to moral knowledge, one needs the relevant virtue of prudence, 
and to motivate oneself appropriately in matters conceming sensual pleasure, 
one must have the virtue of temperance, and so on. The problem is that in 
this same work Aristotle seems optimistic that a good number of people can 
acquire these virtues, fully actualize their capacities, and thereby justifiedty 
govern themselves. However, in the passage above cited from The Politics, 
Aristotle seems to undermine his Nicomachean picture somewhat. I leave 
this as an unresolved puzzle, but one that does not undercut my theses, in 
that the superior few would still fully govern themselves on any reading of 
these passages.
The upshot of all of these comments on slaves, women, children, and 
perhaps even educated, refined men in certain circumstances is that there is 
clearly no recognition of self-govemance rights to all people, even all adult 
persons. It just so happens that given the intellectual and deliberative abilities 
of relatively large groups of males, the most practicable political constitution is 
one in which these males do in fact govern themselves. Moreover, within this
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arrangement, they even seem to have the right to direct their lives as they see 
fit in virtue of their capacities.
In sum, for Aristotle, self-govemance plays a central role in his moral 
and political theory, though the concept is applied most properly to only a 
small minority of the human population.
2.5: The Stoics
The Stoics uphold the tradition of treating ethics, t)oth theoretical and 
practical, as first and foremost the discipline of thought that directs the 
individual to her proper end, namely happiness. The eudaimonistic 
framework mandates that good things are those which are conducive to or 
constitutive of happiness, while bad things are those which hinder the 
attainment of happiness in some way. Perhaps the most prominent theme 
that runs throughout Stoic thought is the role and importance of Nature, and 
in ethics too we find that it is Nature that determines the standard that 
distinguishes the good from the bad.
i. Nature and Nature's Laws
A. A. Long presents the following report on Nature and its role in Stoic
ethics.
Logic and natural philosophy prepare the ground for ethics...Nature, 
which the "physicist" and the dialectician investigate from specific 
points of view, is also in Stoicism the ultimate source of everything 
which has value. So Chrysippus wrote: There is no possible or more 
suitable way to approach the subject of good and bad things, the 
virtues and happiness than from universal Nature and the 
management of the universe." Nature (God, pneuma, cause, /ogos, or 
destiny) is a perfect being, and the value of anything else in the world
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depends upon its relationship to Nature. Accordance with Nature 
denotes positive value and contrariness to Nature the opposite.^
Both a descriptive and prescriptive account of nature underpins Stoic
anthropology and ethics. Ethical theory is indebted to an account of nature,
both universal Nature and human nature, and moreover, ethical principles
derive from the same sources. Because human nature plays a significant
role, the Stoics give to it careful attention. Such attention is evident in their
characterization of the distinct stages of maturation of human nature in an
individual. The development of human nature from infancy to fully mature
adulthood affects and determines what actions are deemed appropriate and
inappropriate.
Cicero analyzes human nature's development as a process consisting 
of five stages.
The starting point being, then, so constituted that what is natural is to 
be taken for its own sake and what is unnatural is to be rejected, the 
first appropriate action (for that is what I call kathekon) is that it should 
preserve itself in its natural constitution; and then that it should retain 
what is according to nature and reject what is contrary to nature. After 
this [pattern of] selection and rejection is discovered, there then follows 
appropriate selection, and then constant [appropriate] selection, and 
finally [selection] which is stable and in agreement with nature; and 
here for the first time we begin to have and to understand something 
which can truly be called good. For man's first sense of congeniality is 
to what is according to nature; but as soon as he gets an 
understanding, or rather a conception and sees the ordering and, I 
might say, concord of things which are to be done, he then values that 
more highly than all those things which he loved in the beginning, and 
he comes to a conclusion by intelligence and reasoning, with the result 
that he decides that this is what the highest good for man consists in, 
which is to be praised and chosen for its own sake (3.20-21).^
34
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Long offers an informative interpretation of Cicero's analysis, and shows how
the notion of function plays a pivotal role in Stoic thought from both an
anthropolgical and ethical perspective.
From infancy onwards a pattern of behavior is sanctioned by Nature as 
appropriate to man (and other creatures), but the pattern changes as 
man matures from a creature whose responses are purely animal-like 
and instinctive into an adult fully endowed with reason. Each of the 
five stages traced by Cicero assigns a function to human beings which 
is appropriate to them at particular periods of their development. 
Human nature, as so defined, is an evolving phenomenon, a concept 
which gives distinctive character to Stoic ethics. Things which are 
appropriate at an early stage do not cease to be such later. But their 
relation to the function of a man changes as he changes. Each new 
stage adds something which modifies the immediately preceding 
function. The goal of the progression is life in accordance with mature 
human nature, that is, a life governed by rational principles which are 
in complete harmony with the rationality, goals, and processes of 
universal Nature.^
The defining feature of human nature in the mature individual, and
therefore human nature most properly conceived, is reason. Living according
to or consistently with nature at this final stage is living according to the law or
precepts of nature that reason discerns. The notion of law and its role in
guiding conduct is another important element in Stoic thought. Their idea is
that nature itself contains a law that is binding on human conduct. Cicero
treats this notion of natural law and its connection to action throughout his
Laws. He introduces the general concept of law and some related notions in
the following passage where he seeks to uncover the origin of justice.
Now let us investigate the origins of Justice. Well then, the most 
learned men fiave determined to begin with Law, and it would seem 
that they are right, if, according to their definition. Law is the highest 
reason, implanted by Nature, which commands what ought to be done 
and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully
36 Long, p. 188.
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developed in the human mind, is Law. And so they believe that Law is 
intelligence, whose natural function it is to command right conduct and 
forbid wrongdoing...For as they have attributed the idea of fairness to 
the word law, so we have given it that of selection, though both ideas 
properly belong to Law. Now if this is correct, as I think it to be in 
general, then the origin of Justice is to be found in Law, for Law is a 
natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the 
standard by which Justice and Injustice are measured (I. vi.).^ ^
Nature promulgates its own law that morally binds human behavior.
Cicero notes that the idea of selection pertains to the notion of law. The idea
of selection refers to the process of choice that undergoes change as human
nature develops, as indicated in the preceding passage from Cicero. Hence,
there are natural law precepts relevant to each of the five developmental
stages of human nature, though what most concerns Stoic thinkers are the
laws pertinent to a fully mature, and therefore fully rational, person.
Reason in tandem with nature, specifically the law of nature, dictates
what is acceptable and unacceptable with regard to action. So an ethical
standard for action guidance is in place. This standard represents the proper
object of moral epistemology. If a person were to know nature's moral laws,
then he would meet the epistemic condition necessary for self-governance. I
will begin fleshing out this issue and others by turning to the Stoic moral ideal:
the sage.
ii. The Sage
The Stoic sage or wise person is an individual who is fully 
knowledgeable and flourishing. The sage represents the pinnacle of moral
37 Cicero. Laws.
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formation and development. Referring to the sage and virtue, Diogenes 
Laertius notes,
The wise man does everything well, as we also say that Ismenias 
plays all the flute tunes well...They say that the virtues follow on each 
other and that he who has one has them all. For [the virtues'] 
theoretical principles are common...For he who has virtue has a 
theoretical knowledge of what is to be done and also practises it. And 
what one is to do and choose is also what one is to endure for and 
stand firmly by and distribute, so that if he does some things by way of 
choosing and others by way of enduring and others by way distributing 
and others by standing firmly by [something], one will be prudent and 
courageous and just and temperate (7.125).^
The sage is fully virtuous, which includes both intellectual and moral virtues.
It is through the intellectual virtues, especially prudence (phrones/s) that the
sage has full access to the moral law. Because the sage has full knowledge 
of moral standards, he easily fulfills the epistemic condition of self- 
govemance. IVIoreover, for the Stoics, the virtues are essentially connected, 
so that if a person possesses one virtue fully, he possesses all of them fully.
In other words, the sage not only completely has the intellectual virtues 
relevant to knowledge of moral laws, he also em bodies the moral virtues, 
which pertain to the proper cultivation of emotions and other issues 
surrounding motivation. These other moral virtues, such as courage and 
temperance, produce good emotional states.
Long remarks on the sage's proper knowledge and emotional 
comportment.
[The sage] knows infallibly what should be done in each situation of life 
and takes every step to do it at the right time and in the right way...[He] 
is free from passion. Anger, anxiety, cupidity, dread, elation, these and 
similar extreme emotions are all absent from his disposition. He does
^  Laertius, Diogenes.
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not regard pleasure as something good, nor pain as something 
evil...The Stoic sage is not insensitive to painful or pleasurable 
sensations, but they do not 'move his soul excessively'. He is 
impassive towards them. But he is not entirely impassive...His 
disposition is characterized by good emotional states.'^ ^
The absence of extreme passions and the cultivation of good emotional
dispositions allow for proper motivation. The motivational requirement is
fulfilled in the sage in virtue of his inner calm and tranquillity, i.e., his moral
virtuousness. The eudaimonist motivational structure underpinning Stoic
thought allows for motives issuing from internal sources. Full knowledge of
what the law dictates provides a natural desire to act appropriately. Only
uncultivated passions and related inner turmoil can undercut this natural
motivational process.
In the context of the sage, the Stoics make explicit claims about the
proper authority to self-govem. Diogenes Laertius notes the following about
the sage.
He alone is free, and the base men are slaves; for freedom is the 
authority to act on one’s own, while slavery is the privation of [the 
ability] to act on one's own...Not only are the wise free, but they are 
also kings, since kingship is a form of rule not subject to review, which 
only the wise could have...For [Chrysippus] says that the ruler must 
know about good and bad things and that none of the base 
understands these things (7.121-122).
The sage possesses the right to rule himself, as indicated by the claim that
true and full freedom bestows the proper authority to act on one's own
judgment and not be subject to the review of others. True and full freedom
issue from the sage's virtue, which are those qualities that enable the full
cultivation of the psychological capacities relating to knowledge, motivation.
39 Long, p. 205-207.
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and choice. The Stoics affirm the Platonic biconditional, which claims that 
fully possessing psychological capacities requisite for self-govemance is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for possessing the proper authority to 
exercise self-govemance. A full possession of the requisite capacities 
involves the cultivation of the virtues, which enables the capacities to become 
fully functional.
So, like Plato and Aristotle before them, the Stoics develop a robust 
conception of self-governance, and that concept proves to play a central, 
positive role in their ethical theory. Also like Plato and Aristotle, the Stoic 
affirmation of the self-govemance biconditional and their thesis that not all 
individuals have the requisite capacities, or at least such individuals do not 
have sufficiently developed capacities, as indicated by the passage above, 
commit them to holding that not all people have the proper authority to govern 
their own lives.
III. The Base
Consonant with the preceding ethical tradition, the Stoics spend 
considerable effort detailing the nature of the worst possible person, the base 
or vicious individual. Moral development sometimes goes astray, and the 
Stoics believe it is important to discover the exact causes of such moral 
degeneration, particularly so that such a state of wretchedness can be 
avoided by others. Recall Cicero's description of the developmental stages of 
human nature.
The starting point being, then, so constituted that what is natural is to
be taken for its own sake and what is unnatural is to be rejected, the
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first appropriate action (for that is what I call /rafhekon) is that it should 
preserve itself in its natural constitution; and then that it should retain 
what is according to nature and reject what is contrary to nature. After 
this [pattern of] selection and rejection is discovered, there then follows 
appropriate selection, and then constant [appropriate] selection, and 
finally [selection] which is stable and in agreement with nature (On 
Goa/s. 3.20).
The goal of this development is to reach full maturity, which is characterized
by rationality and life in accordance with it. This goal, however, is not always
attained. Long remarks to this effect.
The majority of men never fully attain to the final stage, and many of 
them do not reach even the fourth. If this were a purely descriptive 
statement of evolution from infancy to maturity foolish or bad men 
would not exist. They do exist because...the perfection of human 
nature is not determined independently of man's own efforts.^
There is an inequality with respect to capacity for self-govemance
because there exist varying degrees of developing this capacity, or what is
the same thing, moral development. Some people get stuck at an earlier
stage of maturation. Long mentions that some do not even reach the fourth
stage of constant appropriate selection. What follows from his point is that a
fair number of people develop only to the stage where they have sufficient
knowledge and ability to choose appropriately, but they then fail to choose
appropriately in a consistent manner. Coupled with other Stoic passages, the
picture that emerges is one similar to Plato's description of the degeneration
of the soul. The Stoics maintain that most every adult person has at least
minimal knowledge of appropriate action, but at some point in the
development of many adults, there is a moral failure to tame the passions.
The passions gradually gain strength and eventually take over.
40 Long, p. 188.
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Everyone in a state of passion turns his kiack on reason, not like those 
who are deceived on some point or other, but in a special sense. For 
those who are deceived, about atoms being principles for instance, 
when they are taught that they do not exist, then abandon their belief. 
But those who are in a state of passion, even if they do learn and are 
taught that one should not suffer pain or fear or generally experience 
any of the passions of the soul, still do not abandon them but are 
drawn by the passions into being dominated by their tyrannical rule 
(lOa/^
Once baseness becomes entrenched, the possibility of self-rule is precluded. 
The vices prevent the psychological capacities relevant to self-govemance 
from being accessible. The base individual's passions cause him to be 
perpetually inattentive to the moral law, and the same passions prevent him 
from motivating himself to do what is contrary to the promptings of vice.
However, in the non-extreme cases, self-govemance, even if not fully 
realized as in the instance of the sage, plays an important roie, particularly in 
near mature and mature human beings who are not yet wise. In these cases, 
from the Stoic viewpoint, a person has some capacity for self-rule by both an 
incomplete mastery of the passions and some knowledge from natural 
inclinations and reason about what is appropriate. Also, when such a person 
finds herself in a situation where her limited moral knowledge is insufficient, 
the Stoics recommend looking to the sage and imitating his behavior, since 
he always does what is most appropriate. So by asking the question, "What 
would Socrates or Zeno have done in these circumstances? (33)^ ,^ a person 
can in a sense extend her moral knowledge to help make the appropriate 
decision. Though only the sage has full authority to self-govern, many others
Stobaeus, John, Anfho/pgy.
^  Epictetus. Handbook of Ep/cfefus.
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have the ability to do so, and should do so for the most part. The mature non- 
sagacious person, like Plato's timocratic individual and perhaps Aristotle's 
democratic citizen, has a legitimate, though truncated possession of the right 
to govern himself.
In sum, the Stoics prize self-governance as necessary to full 
flourishing. Human nature gives to the average person what is necessary to 
minimally exercise the capacity of self-rule, but through poor decision-making, 
a person may lose the ability to perform such governance. Only the sage 
who has a fully developed capacity of self-governance is thought to have full 
authority or right to govern himself completely.
2.6: Augustine
The preceding philosophers offer to us a remarkably unified narrative of 
ethical inquiry and theory. The homogeneity of themes and issues no doubt 
arises from the careful consideration that each thinker rendered to his 
predecessors. The leap from the Stoics to Augustine causes a noticeable rift 
in this narrative. Augustine's thought consists of a loosely systematic attempt 
to articulate, explain, and defend the various doctrines of Christianity and its 
associated worldview. Moreover, Augustine did not have access to many of 
the texts from the preceding Greek (and Roman, depending on how Stoics 
such as Cicero are classified) tradition.
Nevertheless, Augustine was both familiar with and influenced by 
thinkers and themes of this tradition due to his pre-Christian conversion
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education and consequent career in rhetoric. The Stoic theory of law is an 
instance of such an influence. Due to this connection, Augustine's account of 
law is a fitting place to begin my overview.
I. The Law and God's Authority
Augustine adopts and adapts Cicero's distinction of kinds of laws into
his own explication of God's ruling activity and authority over His creation,
namely humanity. Recall that Cicero believes that in nature there is a
universal and fixed law. All other laws, such as civil law, are evaluated
against this universal standard. Cicero states in his Laws,
But in fact we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad 
by referring them to no other standard than Nature (I, xvi, 45).
Nature's laws are in turn discovered by right reason.
For those creatures who have received the gift of reason from Nature
have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received 
the gift of law, which is right reason applied to command and 
prohibition (I, xi, 33).
On Augustine's Christianized account, this fixed law is referred to as eternal
law, while all other laws are deemed temporal.
I think too that you understand that in temporal law there is nothing just 
and lawful which men have not derived from eternal law...To put in a 
few words, as best I can, the notion of eternal law that has been 
impressed upon our minds: it is that law by which it is just that 
everything be ordered in the highest degree (On Free Oho/ce of fhe 
M//, I, Vi, 50-51)."^
The eternal law provides the evaluative standard upon which all other 
laws and precepts are to be judged. Most importantly, though, is that the 
eternal law is God's law. Augustine maintains that God is responsible for the
43 Augustine. On Free Oho/ce of the W///.
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law and that it is He who impresses this law upon the minds of human beings 
in order to provide a standard of right conduct.'*^  The notion of God's eternal 
law constitutes a fundamental element in Augustine's thought, for it is through 
this notion that Augustine explains God's authority and rulership over His 
creation. God rules over humanity, in part, by impressing standards upon us. 
This idea of rulership raises a general conceptual issue that I need to 
address.
In Schneewind's interpretation of Aquinas, he claims that Aquinas 
precludes self-governance through his insistence that God rules over us. I 
have already addressed this point in chapter 1, but it raises a more general 
objection concerning conceptual consistency. One might think that the
concept of a  suprem e being ruling human beings automatically precludes the 
possibility of self-governance on the part of humanity. For how could a 
person rule himself, if he were already ruled by God? In other words, 
affirming both self-governance and G od’s governance seem s to result in an 
inconsistency.
However, I do not believe that these two notions are logically 
inconsistent. Consider the following model. If by God's rule, it is meant the 
moral law God has decreed for human beings, i.e., an objective moral 
standard by which a person should live her life, then there is no more 
incompatibility between self-govemance and God's rule than with self-
^  An issue of some importance is whether the eternal law is understood by 
Augustine in a voluntaristic or intellectualist manner. Bits of both characterizations 
are to be found in Augustine, making an interpretation difficult. For a citation of 
contemporary scholarship on this issue, see Burt, O.S.A, p. 41.
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governance and any objective moral standard. A person would govern her 
life according to the standards set forth by God. Now, I am not maintaining 
that anyone who affirms God's governance of His creation also affirms that 
human beings can govern themselves. My general point is only that the 
concepts of self-governance and God's rule are not logically incompatible.
Specifically, I do not believe Augustine conceptualizes the two notions 
inconsistently. According to Augustine, God rules us through His eternal law, 
and He, as creator, has the proper authority to do so. Augustine treats the 
issue of self-governance within the context of humanity's response to the 
eternal law. In fact, this context provides the backdrop for much of his ethical 
theory.
II. Free Choice of the Will
Augustine’s ethical theory is structured by the sam e eudaimonistic
considerations as in the ancient thinkers.
Insofar as all men seek the happy life, they do not err. Insofar as each 
man fails to follow the road of life that leads to happiness, although he 
may confess and profess that he is unwilling to arrive anywhere except 
at happiness, he is in error. His error is that he follows something that 
does not lead to where he wishes to arrive. The greater his error on 
the road of life, the less his wisdom, and the further he is from the truth 
in which the highest good is discerned and grasped. Moreover, when 
the highest good has been pursued and obtained, each man becomes 
happy-which beyond a doubt is what we all wish (II, ix, 101-102).
Human beings desire happiness. Legitimate moral standards, in effect,
demarcate between good and bad things and related activities, therefore
guiding a person to what is good, i.e., what contributes to happiness. On this
view, the highest good, which assures complete happiness, is God.
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Augustine introduces a new concept, or at least emphasizes in a new way,
when he discusses why not all people achieve happiness. This concept is
that of the will (vo/unfas).'^  In the following exchange, Augustine explains this
function of the will.
Augustine: But do you think that every man does not in every way 
want and desire the happy life?
Evodius: Who doubts that every man wants a happy life?
Augustine: Why then do not all men achieve it? For we have said and 
agreed between us that it is by the will that men merit a happy life, and 
by the will that they merit an unhappy one.. .Thus when we say that 
men are unhappy because of their will, we do not mean that they wish 
to be unhappy, but that they are in that state of will where unhappiness 
must result even if they do not want it (I, xiv, 99; 102).
According to Augustine, a person is free in the sense of having the ability to
choose one course of action over another. The locus of this freedom resides
in the capacity or power or the will. The will, then, is the central feature of his
ethical theory. For if a person stands to merit happiness or otherwise, it is in 
virtue of his exercise of the will. Augustine underscores the will's centrality in
his summary of Book I of On Free Choice of the Will.
We have established, moreover, that what each man chooses to 
pursue and to love lies in his own will, and that the mind cannot be 
disposed from the citadel of mastery or from right order by anything 
except the will (I, xvi, 114).
A person is happy if he loves God above all other things and obeys His laws.
Every person is capable of obtaining this happiness on account of the power
of the will to either seek or spurn the path to the highest good.
^  Perhaps the best account of Augustine's concept of will as new is that of Albrecht 
Dihle's study.
III. Conditions for Self-Governance
Augustine seems to develop a moral ttieory that acknowledges and 
defines an important role for self-govemance. Through the will's freedom, a 
person is able to direct her own life, with the road to happiness lying in the 
eternal law of God. Augustine devotes much thought to the consideration of 
the capacities relevant to self-govemance. Like the Stoics, Augustine often 
develops his moral positions through the example cuid nature of the moral 
ideal: the wise man. Augustine also expands on his moral ideas by 
describing the process of becoming a wise individual.
So even if the goods are many and varied from which each man may
choose what he wishes, determining to discern, grasp, and enjoy the 
highest good rightly and truly, nevertheless, it is possible that the very 
light of wisdom, in which these goods can be discerned and grasped, 
is one wisdom common to all wise men (II, ix, 108).
This wisdom, in turn, instructs a person on how to master himself.
Therefore, when reason, whether mind or spirit, rules the irrational 
emotions, then there exists in man the very mastery which the law that 
we know to t)e eternal prescribes (I, viii, 65).
As a person conforms himself to the law that he understands in virtue of
wisdom, he achieves increasing control over what he can do relative to his
own capacities. In the following conversation, Augustine further clarifies the
positive impact that wisdom acquisition has in a person's life. One note of
explanation: for Augustine 'incorruption' refers to what is eternal and
unchanging, while 'corruption' refers to what is temporal and changing.
Augustine: Likewise, doesn't that man who lives prudently choose 
incorruption and judge that incorruption is to be preferred to 
corruption?
Evodius: Most clearly.
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Augustine: Therefore, when he chooses to turn his spirit to that which 
no one doubts should be chosen, it cannot be denied, can it, that he 
chooses wisely?
Evodius: Of course not.
Augustine: When, therefore, he turns his mind to a wise choice, he 
does so wisely.
Evodius: Certainly.
Augustine: And he acts wisely who is not turned by fear or punishment 
from what he chooses or turns to wisely.
Evodius: Without a doubt.
Augustine: It is very clear, then, that all that we have called the rules 
and lights to virtue are a part of wisdom, inasmuch as the more a man 
uses them in leading his life, the more wisely he acts and lives. 
Moreover, whatever is done wisely cannot rightly be said to be 
separate from wisdom (II, x, 117-118).
Augustine advocates that all people should pursue this path of wisdom so as
to satisfy their most basic desire for happiness.
But it is by clinging to truth and wisdom, which are common to all, that 
all men may become wise and happy (II, xix, 197).
These passages contain a wealth of information pertaining to a
person's psychological capacities. Augustine contends that it is possible to
know the eternal moral standards, which are adequate for knowing what
actions are appropriate and which are not. He, therefore, satisfies the
epistemic requirement for self-govemance. Also, he affirms the principle that
a person has the capacity to motivate himself through internal sources, and
even in spite of the threat of punishment, to act according to moral standards.
His theory, then, contains the motivational condition for self-governance.
Augustine proceeds to explain how these capacities should be exercised.
No one becomes prudent through another's prudence, or brave 
through another's courage, or temperate through another's 
temperance. So too, on one t)ecomes just through the justice of 
another. Instead, man obtains virtues by adapting his spirit to the 
immutable rules and lights of those virtues which dwell incorruptible in
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truth itself and in common wisdom, to which the virtuous man has 
adapted himself and fitted his spirit. The man seeking virtue has 
determined to imitate this spirit, because it is endowed with virtue. 
Therefore the will, clinging to common and immutable goods, obtains 
the first and great goods of man, although it is itself only an 
intermediate good (II, xix, 198).
A person cannot obtain the goods necessary for happiness unless she
governs herself through the capacities explaind above. Augustine
encourages all to do those things conducive to happiness. Hence, he
encourages all people to exercise self-governance. Though he doesn't speak
of it in these terms, he seems to recognize through his encouragement that
persons have the authority to exercise self-govemance.
Augustine also warns against the adverse consequences of exercising
self-govemance poorly.
The will, however, commits sin when it tums away from immutable and 
common goods, towards its private good, either something external to 
itself or lower than itself. It turns to its own private good when it 
desires to be its own master; it tums to extemal goods when it busies 
itself with the private affairs of others or with whatever is none of its 
concern; it turns to goods lower than itself when it loves the pleasures 
of the body. Thus a man becomes proud, meddlesome, and lustful; he 
is caught up in another life which, when compared to the higher one, is 
death (II, xix, 199-200).
No doubt this passage calls for careful consideration and clarification. 
Augustine has been formulating a position which advocates that a person 
should utilize the capacities and abilities that he possesses for the sake of 
directing himseif to the acquisition of virtue and other goods conducive to 
happiness. Now, however, he makes it clear that the etemal law (which is 
shorthand for God's will at this point) decrees that it is unacceptable and 
morally wrong for the will to be its own master. A person succumbs to the
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vice of pride by seeking to cling to things for private gain and personal 
aggrandizement. So, it may seem that Augustine is not encouraging self- 
govemance after all. I will let Augustine finish his thought and then offer an 
explanation.
Yet [the person who commits sin] is ruled by the administration of 
divine providence, which places everything in its proper order and 
gives to each what is his own. So it follows that [1] neither the goods 
desired by sinners, nor the free will itself which we found to have t)een 
numbered among certain intermediate goods, are evil in any way, and 
that [2] evil is a turning away from immutable goods. This turning away 
and turning toward result in the just punishment of unhappiness, 
because they are committed, not under compulsion, but voluntarily 
(II,xix, 200).
Augustine is not undercutting his earlier positive comments on self- 
govemance. God's etemal law decrees that each person is to seek good 
things in their proper axiological order. A person has both the knowledge and 
motivational capacity, at least potentially, necessary to direct her actions 
according to the law. A person governs herself badly when she shuns this 
law and seeks to be her "own master" relative to the etemal law/God's will. 
The upshot of this position is that it is prideful and wrong to act as if the law 
does not apply to you. Humans are not their own master with respect to the 
law, for that law is morally binding in all cases. But relative to one's own 
actions, a person tx)th has the capacities, authority, and even obligation to 
direct one's own activity.^
As it tums out, the model I proposed for reconciling God's ruling 
authority and self-govemance in section i is essentially Augustinian. God
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governs each person through His law, but each person governs himself 
through freely choosing his actions and resultant character.
iv. Moral Obligation and the Effects of Sin
Up to now, I have not discussed the nature and role of moral 
obligation, i.e., the obligation a person has to conform his behavior to proper 
moral standards, within this historical narrative. The notion of moral 
duty/obligation is not absent in the ancient period, for instance, the Stoics 
discuss the idea in some detail. However, issues of obligation do not 
substantially intersect with those of self-govemance until Augustine, or so I 
maintain.
Recall from chapter 1 that Kant believes the source of obligation must 
be internal to a person for him to be autonomous and therefore fully self- 
governing. For if a person were to submit to the extemal authority of another 
person, he would not truly be governing himseif but rather be governed by 
another. Schneewind thinks this notion of internal authority is new with Kant, 
or at least not present in say the modem natural law tradition, some 
contributors of which had theories of self-govemance. Hence, according to 
Schneewind's own account, obligation and its source do not really constitute 
a necessary feature or presupposition of self-govemance. Nevertheless, I 
believe it is an important issue that, due at least to its historical relevance to 
Kant's influential notions of self-govemance and autonomy, needs to be 
treated closely.
Augustine's thought on the notion of moral obligation plays a doubly
consequential role in my historical account, because of its impact on both
Aquinas and late medieval divine command theorists. Both sides cite
Augustine as justification for their own positions, which are opposed to one
another. This bilateral usage is made possible because Augustine's writings
on these matters are a bit perplexing and seemingly inconsistent.
Augustine's views of moral obligation are intimately connected with his
characterization of human nature, which in turn is affected by his stance on
the effects of sin. In this section I will draw from Augustine's T7?e CAy of God.
This work was written long after On Free Chofice of the M/y//, and its
characterization of the effects of sin on human nature is much more severe
and devastating relative to his earlier works. I will look at a couple of entries
from 77?e C/fy of God that treat both sin and obedience. Augustine articulates
the general stance that humanity stands to God in a relation of obedience to
Him, and therefore we have an obligation to follow His will. Any and all
disobedience to His will is termed sin.'
We have already stated in the preceding books that God, desiring not 
only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to 
associate with one another, but also that they might be bound together 
in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive 
all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that 
the members of the race not have died, had not the two first (of whom 
the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited 
this by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin was committed, 
that by it human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted 
also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death (XIV, 1).^
Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God- 
...who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult
46 Augustine. The C/fy of God.
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commandments, but, in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to 
him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which 
He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was 
Lord-it was just that condemnation followed, and condemnation such 
that man, who by keeping the commandments should have t)een 
spirited even in his flesh, became fleshly even in this spirit; and as in 
his pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice 
abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he 
affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with 
himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he 
had yielded himself (XIV, 15).
The account that emerges from these descriptions is that God 
commands each and every person to ot)ey Him, and the attendant moral 
obligation to do this results from God. So, the obligation to follow God's law 
stems not from a source internal to a person but directly from God's will. Yet 
other passages considered previously seem to indicate that a person's 
knowledge of both the law and the law's happiness-guiding function suffices 
for obligation. In other words, the former account locates the source of 
obligation in the will of God, while the latter account points to something 
internal to the capacities of human nature. I suppose one could give an 
account that resolves the perceived tensions in these texts, but that is not 
important here. More to the point is that Augustine sets forth ideas that could 
reasonable be interpreted and developed in different ways. Furthermore, his 
many thoughts and ideas proved fertile to ensuing thinkers in just this 
manner.
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Chapter 3: Aquinas' Account of Human Nature and Ethics
Aquinas' moral theory provides the strongest evidence against Schneewind's 
claim that pre-modem moral philosophy was devoid of the concept of self- 
govemance. Schneewind never treats the ancient moral theorists explicitly in 
/A, but he does consider certain medieval ethicists, beginning with Aquinas. 
My contention is that Schneewind's inteqaretation of Aquinas' moral theory is 
at best extremely misleading but more likely simply inaccurate. I will continue 
to counter Schneewind's account of the origin, development, and place of 
self-govemance in the history of moral theory by offering a detailed and 
systematic interpretation of Aquinas' moral theory, especially his account of 
the nature and place of self-govemance in morality.
I will approach Aquinas' theory by first exploring his overview of the 
relationship between God's providence or govemance of creation and human 
self-governance. I will then summarize key elements of Aquinas’ 
anthropology, psychology, and ethics that underpin his account of the inner- 
workings of self-direction. Against this backdrop, I will closely attend to the 
specific issues in Aquinas relevant to the epistemic, motivational, and 
authority notions relevant to my understanding of self-govemance. Finally, I 
will consider Aquinas' account of the ultimate foundations of moral obligation 
and will look at the proper place of obedience in his account of ethics.
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3.1 : God's Providence and Self-Governance
Aquinas was above all else a theologian. As such, God is both the starting
and focal point of his work. Moreover, his theology consists of integrating his
own ideas with those who came before him, most notably Augustine.
Perhaps Aquinas' most significant point of departure from Augustinian
theology was his insistence that the effects of sin on human nature and its
capacities were not as severe as Augustine had characterized them.
Departures such as this notwithstanding, Aquinas' general approach to
theology was to adhere to the primary contours of Augustine's thought. It is
not surprising, therefore, that Aquinas devotes extensive space to the issue of
God's providence over creation. It is within this setting that we first find
Aquinas addressing the importance of self-govemance for humanity.
I. Providence and the Human Species
In the following passage, Aquinas reflects on how God’s rule or
governance specifically affects humanity and within this reflection affirms that
human beings rule themselves.
Of course, the result of [God's] rule is manifested differently in different 
beings, depending on the diversity of their natures. For some beings 
so exist as God's products that, possessing understanding, they bear 
His likeness and reflect His image. Consequenf/y, they are not or?/y 
m/ecf W  are a/so nr/ers of /hemse/ves, rr? as muc/? as fhe/r own 
ac/rorrs are drrec/ed /o a ^rng end. If these beings submit to the 
divine rule in their own ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule they are 
admitted to the achievement of their ultimate end; but, if they proceed 
otherwise in their own ruling, they are rejected" (III, 1, 4. Italics 
mine).^ ^
47 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Con/ra Gerrfr/es.
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The theme of human beings as rulers of themselves runs throughout
Aquinas' thought, which of course should be unexpected if Schneewind's
interpretation were correct."*^  Aquinas expands upon this notion of dual-
rulership of humanity by both God and self in the next passage.
First of all, then, the very way in which the intellectual creature was 
made, according as it is master of its own acts, demands providential 
care whereby this creature may provide for itself, on its own behalf; 
while the way in which other things were created, things which have no 
domination over their acts, shows this fact, that they are cared for, not 
for their own sake, but as subordinated to others. That which is moved 
only by another being has the formal character of an instrument, but 
that which acts of itself has the essential character of a principal agent. 
Now, an instrument is not valued for its own sake, but as useful to a 
principal agent. Hence, it must be that all the careful work that is 
devoted to instruments is actually done for the sake of the agent, as for 
an end, but what is done for the principal agent, either by himself or by 
another, is for his own sake, because he is the principal agent. 
Therefore, intellectual creatures are so controlled by God, as objects of 
care for their own sakes; while other creatures are subordinated, as it 
were, to rational creatures (III, 112,1).
Having explained the fundamental difference between non-rational creatures,
those who do not have mastery or dominion over their own actions, and
rational creatures, those who do have such mastery, Aquinas further
distinguishes the different approaches God takes in ruling them.
Again, one who holds domination over his acts is free in his activity,
"for the free man is he who acts for his own sake" (Aristotle, 
Mefaphys/cs, I, 2). But one who is acted upon by another, under 
necessity, is subject to slavery. So, every other creature is naturally 
subject to slavery; only the intellectual creature is by nature free. Now, 
under every sort of government, provision is made for free men for
^  I want to stress that the terminology indicative of self-governance in Aquinas is not 
a mere artifact or accident of the English translation. Consider the Latin text of the 
italicized statement above. Unde et ;spa non so/un? sunt d/recfa, sed ef se^psa 
d/ngenffa secundum propnas adfons /n deb/fum frnem (Opera Omn/a). 0/rgenffa 
derives from the verb dfrfgere meaning "to direct." Se(psa is a reflexive pronoun 
meaning "themselves." Hence serpsa d/rfgenfra indicates that humans, in this case, 
direct or rule themselves, as captured in the translation above.
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their own sakes, but for slaves in such a way that they may be at the 
disposal of free men. And so, through divine providence provision is 
made for intellectual creatures on their own account, but for remaining 
creatures, for the sake of the intellectual ones (III, 112, 2).
God governs non-rational creatures by fully directing them to their
ends. For instance, the squirrel has no choice but to scurry up a tree or bury
acorns, due to an instinct that God has implanted into its nature. However,
with humanity, God rules or governs in a different manner. He does endow
human nature with basic inclinations or impulses, but He does not determine
human beings to act automatically and blindly in accordance with those
inclinations. Rather, through control or "domination" over action, humans can
choose whether to act in accordance with the inclinations.
II. Providence and the Individual Person
So far, Aquinas has explored how God's rule or govemance is realized
in the human species. Having established to his satisfaction that God rules
humanity differently than other creatures, Aquinas turns his attention to how
the individual human person is ruled by God, and how, as it tums out, the
individual can exercise self-govemance. Aquinas begins his analysis by
contrasting the human individual with the individuals of other species.
It is evident, as a result, that only the rational creature is directed by 
God to his actions, not only in accord with what is suitable to the 
species, but also in accord with what is suitable to the individual. Each 
thing appears to exist for the sake of its operation; indeed, operation is 
the ultimate perfection of a thing. Therefore, each thing is ordered to 
its action by God according to the way in which it is subordinated to 
divine providence. Now, a rational creature exists under divine 
providence as being governed and provided for in himself, and not 
simply for the sake of his species, as is the case with other corruptible 
creatures. For the individual that is govemed only for the sake of the
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species is not governed for its own sake, but the rational creature is 
governed for his own sake (III, 113, 1).
God governs each individual human being, in virtue of t)eing a free, 
intellectual creature, for the sake of that individual. God gives to each 
individual the guidance necessary to achieve happiness (the ultimate end) but 
does not necessitate the activity that would produce happiness. In the next 
passage, Aquinas speaks of the capacity of individual self-govemance as a 
share or participation in divine providence that God gives to each human 
being.
Furthermore, the [individual] rational creature is subject to divine 
providence in such a way that he is not only govemed thereby, but is 
also able to know the rational plan of providence in some way. Hence, 
it is appropriate for him to exercise providence and government over 
other things. This is not the case with other creatures, for they 
participate in providence only to the extent of being sut)ordinate to it. 
Through this possession of the capacity to exercise providence one 
may also direct and govern his own acts. So, the rational creature 
participates in divine providence, not only by being governed passively, 
but also by governing actively, for he governs himself in his personal 
acts (III, 113,5. Italics mine).
Aquinas clearly affirms active self-govemance on a person's part. He
declares that God's providence does extend to each and every human t)eing,
but also that each and every person shares in this providence by goveming
his own activity.^  ^ Aquinas stresses the active role of human self-
govemance by contrasting its role to the mere passive participation in
govemance on the part of non-rational creatures.
^  Previously, Aquinas employed the verb d/rfgere to convey the idea that persons 
direct their own behavior. In this passage, he uses the verb gubemare, which adds 
the connotation of political govemance. The italicized statement reads as, Padrc(paf 
ygrtur rahona/Âs creatura drvfnum prov/denf/am no so/um secundum gubeman, sed 
et/am secundum gubemare; gubemat en/m se /n su/s act/bus propn/s (Opera 
Omn/a).
Throughout these passages Aquinas emphasizes both humanity's
active and passive participation in God's ruling or providential care of
creation. I have focused on the active element of self-govemance in this
section and will turn to the makeup of humanity's passive participation in the
next couple of sections. I wish to underscore that the passive elements in
God's govemance of humanity in no way threaten or undermine Aquinas'
positive remarks about self-govemance. The gist of humanity's passive
participation is that human nature possesses several natural inclinations,
which form part of the foundation of the natural law. The moral law can be
characterized at this point as the standard upon which human acts are
evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate.
Again, the rational creature, as we have said, is so subjected to divine 
providence that he even participates in a certain likeness of divine
providence, in so far as he is able to govern himself in his own acts, 
and also others. Now, that whereby the acts of such agents are 
governed is called law. Quite appropriately, then, law was given to 
men by God (III, 114, 2).
Like Augustine, Aquinas' view of God's providence includes the moral law,
which God gives to humans for guidance.
Hi. Providence and Schneewind
Aquinas is keenly aware that he must make careful distinctions if he is 
going to support both individual human self-govemance and God's 
govemance of humanity. The distinctions he makes would allow him to reply 
quite easily to Schneewind's characterization of his theory, which I examined 
in chapter 1. Recall that Schneewind discusses how Aquinas interprets 
Paul's dictum that we are a law unto ourselves. Schneewind contends that
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Aquinas interprets Paul in such a way as to favor an obedience-based
conception of morality that entirely precludes self-govemance. To re-quote,
Schneewind states,
[Paul's dictum] does not say that we rule ourselves [according to 
Aquinas]. "[PJroperly speaking," Thomas says, "none imposes a law 
on his own actions." Through awareness of the laws of nature, 
however imperfect, we participate in God's etemal law. But St. Paul 
means that the law is within us not only "as in one who rules, but 
also...as in one that is ruled." Our participation in the eternal law 
shows that we are not self-governed. We are govemed by another.^
Given the position of Aquinas expressed in the preceding passages
and even in the quote given by Schneewind, it is evident that Schneewind
draws a wrong interpretive inference. Aquinas does affirm that we are
govemed by another, namely God. However, in virtue of our rational and
intellectual nature, God rules us in such a way so as to both include and
promote self-governance on our part. Schneewind seems to interpret
Aquinas' comments about God's rule of non-rational creatures as applicable
to human beings as well. Nevertheless, Aquinas’ position is well articulated.
God rules the non-rational creatures by necessitating them to their proper
operation. The proper operation of human beings, on the other hand,
includes self-govemance, and for this reason, God's providence over us does
not preclude, but rather promotes full individual self-govemance. In sum,
God's rule does not conflict with the recognition that individuals may possess
the proper authority to self-govem.
50 Schneewind, p. 21.
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3.2: Anthropology and Psychology
Aquinas plainly includes a notion he tenns self-governance in his account of 
human nature and its proper activities. But is this all that needs to be said on 
the issue? Is what Aquinas calls "self-govemance" the same general concept 
that is so important to late modem and contemporary moral theorists? Does 
Aquinas' notion include the idea that people are able to reason out for 
themselves what ought to be done and then motivate themselves to perform 
the appropriate action in the absence of extemal reinforcements? If 
individuals do in fact possess these capacities, do they have the proper moral 
authority to exercise them, or does "moral obligation" for most individuals 
consist of a mere deference to another person or institution?
I intend to answer these questions with the aim of establishing that the 
notion Aquinas refers to as active self-governance meets the three conditions 
used by Schneewind. In the next two sections, I will set forth the basic 
structure and content of Aquinas' account of human nature and ethics. My 
subsequent arguments will presuppose these elements in his general theory.
i. The Soul
Aquinas identifies the rational soul as the most distinctive feature of 
human nature, and therefore the individual person. The soul, in Aquinas' 
Aristotelian anthropology, is what makes a thing alive, and it provides the 
source of a given thing's capabilities and powers. The human soul has 
several capacities and powers. It has all of the capabilities of a vegetative 
soul, namely nourishment and reproduction, an animal soul, namely
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sensation and movement, and lastly those abilities pertinent to the rational 
element, namely thinking, understanding, and free choice. The human 
person, then, has several abilities at his disposal in virtue of his nature as 
human.
Aquinas also contends that each ability found in human nature 
possesses a built-in inclination or appetite that naturally inclines a person to 
certain objects/ends. He explains that, "The natural appetite is that inclination 
which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its 
natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself (Summa 
Theo/og/ca, I, 78,1).^^ A person, then, has several natural abilities or powers, 
such as sensation and reasoning, and each of these powers has a natural 
appetite or inclination to whatever is most suitable to it, which is a way of 
saying that the end or object sought by the inclination is what most enables 
the power in question to operate in the best possible manner.
ii. The Sensitive Appetite
The first of the soul's inherent abilities I wish to consider in some detail 
are those relating to its sensitive nature, which refers to sensation through the 
five senses. For Aquinas, the soul has a basic impulse or inclination to seek 
or avoid objects perceived through perception. This inclination is called the 
sensitive appetite. The sensitive appetite is a moving or motivating power. A 
person is motivated to seek food, for instance, through the sensitive appetite 
causing him to desire food immediately grasped by the senses, or mediately
51 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theo/og/ca.
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through memory. Aquinas distinguished two basic kinds of desires within the
sensitive appetite: the concupiscible and the irascible.
The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; 
but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive 
appetite-the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this 
clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is 
needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and 
to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against 
corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the 
acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm...Therefore, 
since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive 
apprehension...there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetite 
powers-one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is 
suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and 
this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal 
resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and 
this is called the irascible (I, 81, 2).
In Aquinas' account of the basic psychological makeup common to all human
beings, there are inherent motivating powers that pertain to self-preservation
and bodily well-being. As Aquinas continues to construct his psychological
theory, he affirms that the rational abilities of human nature have a fair degree
of hegemony over these bodily desires. Replying to an objection that
contends that the sensitive appetite does not obey reason, Aquinas develops
the following line of thought.
But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible 
by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its 
own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the 
sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power 
in otfier animals, and in many by the cogitative power which the 
universal reason guides, but also by imagination and sense. Whence 
it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do 
resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, 
which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so 
from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in 
something, we must not conclude that they do not obey [reason] (I, 81, 
3).
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Aquinas, like his predecessors in the eudaimonistic self-govemance 
tradition, carefully attends to human nature's psychological capacities 
because self-governance begins with these capacities. Human beings have 
basic motivating powers correlated with sensory apprehension, but as it 
stands, those powers are not always under the complete control of a person. 
Much of Aquinas' ethics is dedicated to deciphering ways of mastering this 
source of motivation so that an individual can effectively govern himself. 
There is one last important feature of Aquinas' psychology that is relevant to 
self-govemance-namely, the will and its relation to reason.
HI. The Rational Will
Aquinas formulates his account of the free, rational will in part through
a combination of Aristotle's insights into the voluntary nature of action and
Augustine’s more specific notion of the will as the locus of freedom in a
person. Aquinas situates his account within the context of the soul’s
constitutive powers and attendant appetites. He develops his notion of the
will by considering its rational appetitive nature. I cite two complementary
passages that shed a great deal of light on the two main, interrelated features
of the human will. The first passage spells out the will's rational
characteristics through a comparison with brute or non-human animals, which
lack reason. The second passage supplements the first by fleshing out the
will's natural appetitiveness.
Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, 
prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain. In order to 
make this evident, we must observe that some things act without
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judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things 
which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free 
judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a 
thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it 
judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing 
is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from 
judgment, t>ecause by his apprehensive power he judges that 
something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in 
the case of some particular act, is not from natural instinct, but from 
some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free 
judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For 
reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses as we see in 
dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular 
operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment 
of reason may follow different courses, and is not determinate to one. 
And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free­
will (1,83, 1).
The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will 
because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to 
choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by 
considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: 
one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the 
appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is 
required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and 
on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetitive 
should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Efh/cs, vi, 
2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetite 
or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either an ^peAf/ve 
/nWecf or an /nfe//ecfua/ appeA'fe. But (Efh/cs, iii loc. cit) he inclines to 
its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as a desire 
proceecf/ng from counse/. And the reason of this is because the proper 
object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the 
nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as 
such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an 
act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power (I, 
83, 3).
The will is an appetite in that it perpetually seeks or desires the good.
It is a rational or intellectual appetite in that it works with reason to pass
judgement on what the best good is relative to the particular circumstances.
Notice that Aquinas has specified two motivating or appetitive powers in
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human nature: the sensitive appetite, which is further specified as the
concupiscible and irascible desires, and the rational appetite or will. I will
focus on the significance of the distinction of and interaction between these
two appetites when I offer an analysis of the motivational requirement of self-
governance in Aquinas' moral theory.
Aquinas makes one significant qualification to the will's freedom. The
will, though otherwise free, must necessarily seek the perfect or complete
good, which is happiness (beaf/fudo-for the Greek euda/mon/a).
Now the object of the will, i.e., of man's appetite, is the universal good; 
just as the object of the intellect is universal true. Hence it is evident 
that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good (l-ll, 2, 8).
Aquinas proceeds to clarify the nature of the ultimate good.
Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the 
general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man desires 
happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect 
good, as stated above. But since good is the object of the will, the 
perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. 
Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that 
one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires (l-ll, 5, 8).
In other words, the will is not free with respect to seeking complete
happiness. The will's appetitive nature is directed to the end of happiness.
The notion of complete happiness causes the will to automatically incline
towards and desire objects that are thought to be conducive to happiness.
The will's natural desire for happiness provides Aquinas with both a starting
point and overall aim for treating ethics.
96
3.3: Ethics
I shall address three core ideas in this overview of Aquinas' ethical theory. I 
need to extend my discussion on the will's natural desire for happiness and 
the nature of this happiness. Also, I must examine the current that runs 
throughout Aquinas' work that human beings are the masters of their actions. 
Finally, I offer a basic outline of the place of the natural law in his ethical 
account.
I. The Will and Happiness
The human will, which is ultimately responsible for initiating action, 
must of necessity seek happiness. Moreover, any particular object or end 
sought by the will can only be sought after insofar as it appears to be good, 
that is, something that is conducive to happiness in some way. This is what 
Aquinas means when he maintains that things can only be willed sub ratio 
bon/, or under the appearance or notion of goodness.^ Consequently, like 
many of the eudaimonists preceding him, if Aquinas is going to propose an 
ethic, he must show that it is conducive to a person's happiness. Otherwise, 
a person would simply be unable, given her psychological makeup, to act in 
accordance with the ethical norms.
^  Ralph Mclnerny's commentary on this notion fleshes out its pervasiveness in 
Aquinas' system by using what might be thought to be mundane examples. For 
instance, consider the example of a mere choice of eating a hamburger. T h is  raf/o 
boni or reason for choosing any and everything we choose is what Thomas means 
by ultimate end. If it is the case that we choose foodstuffs as assuaging hunger, 
there is implicit in the choice that satisfying our hunger is good for us. And so too 
with other particular choices," p. 30. This book represents, perhaps, the best 
contemporary, English introduction to Aquinas' ethics.
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Recall that for Aquinas, a person's will seeks complete or universal
good, which is to say that only an infinite good could satiate a person's
desires. Aquinas is going beyond the ancient tradition in this instance and is
aligning himself with Augustine. For Aquinas believes that only one thing can
actually fulfill the requirements of being a universal good, namely God.
Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal 
good. This is to be found, not in.any créature, but in God alone; 
because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore 
God alone can satisfy the will of man...(l-ll, 2, 8).
Such complete happiness cannot be obtained in this life for the simple reason
that we do not have the kind of access to God necessary to achieve it.
Nevertheless, there is a more limited notion of happiness that is obtainable
here and now, which Aquinas terms imperfect or incomplete happiness.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to 
come, consists entirely in contemplation [of God]. But imperfect 
happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally in 
contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the practical intellect
directing human actions and passions, as stated in [Aristotle’s] Ethics 
X, 7,8 (l-ll, 3, 5).
Imperfect happiness is sufficient to motivate human action. Hence, 
spelling out what this type of happiness consists in is adequate for giving to 
any person sufficient motivation to act in such a way as to acquire it. For the 
most part, then, the notion of imperfect happiness fulfills the function that 
euda/mon/a performs in ancient Greek ethics. It grounds certain approaches 
to life and types of actions as appropriate and acceptable as others 
inappropriate and unacceptable.
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ii. Mastery and Dominion over Action
In 3 .1 ,1 looked at Aquinas' argument that God exercises His
providence over rational creatures in a manner different from non-rational
creatures on account of the latter having "no dominion over their acts," while
the former "holds dominion over his own acts" (SCG III, 112,1-2). "Dominion"
in this sense connotes the notion of control. So, to have dominion over one's
own actions is to have control over them. Such control or mastery is what
makes the study of ethics possible, which is why Aquinas begins his treatise
on ethics in the Summa TTreo/og/ca by discussing this concept.
Of actions done by man those alone are properly called human, which 
are proper to man as man. Now mem differs from irrational animals in 
this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone 
are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is 
master of his actions through his reason and will; when, too, the free 
will is defined as the /acu/fy and w/// of reason. Therefore those 
actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will 
(S.T.I-II, 1,1).
Human beings have control over their actions because, for Aquinas,
they are the source and cause of those actions. The will elicits its own
actions and it is free to do whatever it desires, as discussed earlier, with the
one qualification of seeking happiness necessarily. Aquinas discusses the
interplay of mastery over actions and acting for an end (namely the ultimate
end of happiness) in the following passage.
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its 
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the 
end,-as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an 
arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer, 
who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are 
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have 
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the ^cu/fy
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of W / and reason...Consequently, it is proper to the rational nature to 
tend to an end, as d/recdnp and /ead/np rfse/f to fhe end (^e apens /e/ 
ducens ad /rnem) (l-ll, 1,2. Last italics my own. Latin text from Opera 
Omnra).
This passage affords Aquinas with another opportunity to state and develop 
his eudaimonistic self-governance account.^ A person, due to human nature, 
is determined to seek the end of happiness, but she is still free with respect to 
the manner or means by which she may accomplish or obtain this goal. 
Consequently, she directs herself to her end. For Aquinas, in virtue of a 
person's ability to be master over his own actions and his necessary desire 
for happiness, he governs himself in the pursuit of happiness.
Hi. Natural Law
I will explore certain details of Aquinas' conception of the natural moral 
law thoroughly later on. At this point, I wish merely to offer a general picture 
of the nature and role of the law in his overall ethical theory. I will concentrate 
on two ideas. The first is that the precepts of the natural law serve to 
distinguish what is truly good from what appears to be good, but really is not, 
where "good" means "conducive to happiness." The second idea is that the 
precepts arise from practical reason's reflection upon and ordering of the 
various natural inclinations of human nature.
“  The particular terms Aquinas employs to capture what the individual is doing are 
forms of the verbs agere and ducere. This latter term means "to lead.” The former 
term is of special interest both in that it literally means "doing, directing, conducting, 
etc.", and that it is the word from which the English word "agent" is derived. In its 
moral connotation, "agent" captures the notion that a person is a source of action 
and that he is responsible for them, which is found in the Latin root word as well. 
Aquinas deliberately uses this strong word to leave little doubt that a person actively 
directs his own life. In fact all of the terms Aquinas has employed to denote what the 
self does, dingere, gubemare, agere, ducere, are in the active voice.
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The fact that the natural law precepts serve to demarcate true from
merely apparent goods is not really surprising or unexpected. Given Aquinas'
underlying psychology of motivation which maintains that human beings can
only seek and desire objects that appear good to them, it should be expected
that something is needed to distinguish what really brings happiness from
what does not. What that something is, is the naitural law. To understand
what Aquinas means by natural law, we need to look at what he thinks law is
in general. He defines the general nature of law as "nothing else than an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community, and promulgated" (l-ll, 90, 4).
The natural moral law, then, is an ordinance of reason for the good of
the individual and community, made by God, in this case, and promulgated.
Aquinas retums to the theme of God's providence over humanity to explain
further the natural law.
Law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one 
way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that 
which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, 
insofar as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all 
things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the 
eternal law, as was stated above; it is evident that all things partake 
somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being 
imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their 
proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is 
subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it 
partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself 
and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, 
whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this 
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the 
natural law (l-ll, 91,2).
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Law serves as a rule and measure. Human beings, due to our rational
nature, are not simply ruled and measured by God. God imprints an image of
his law onto human nature, which is manifested in our natural desire for
happiness and other natural inclinations which inherently seek what is truly
good or most conducive to our well-being. The rest of the process of arriving
at actual precepts of the natural law is completed through each person's
reason harmonizing and organizing the pursuit of the ends specified by the
natural inclinations. The principles that set forth the best possible way of
pursuing natural ends and thereby achieving happiness constitute the natural
law. Aquinas offers a rigorous account of human nature's inclinations and
their role in the natural law in the next seminal passage on natural law.
good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical 
reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end 
under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle in the 
practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good is 
that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, 
that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. All 
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever 
the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) 
belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or 
avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the 
nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has 
a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being 
good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as 
evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of 
natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. 
Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance 
with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch 
as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according 
to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of 
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the 
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that 
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in 
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those
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things are said to belong to the natural law, wh/ch nature has taught to 
a// antma/s, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so 
forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the 
nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a 
natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: 
and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the 
natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those 
among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the 
above inclination (l-ll, 94,2).
Practical reason, which is simply the capacity and activity of reasoning 
about what course of action to perform, seeks to pursue good and avoid evil 
out of necessity. The moral element concerns a person's striving to obtain 
true, as opposed to merely apparent, goods and avoid real evils. What those 
true goods and real evils are can be known by reflecting upon the dynamics 
of our natural inclinations, since they in a sense point to these objeds. 
Practical reason then deliberates about the best way to pursue all of the 
goods in question, so that the multiple pursuits and acquisitions may be 
compatible with each other. Aquinas is confident that reason's best possible 
organization of this task, a task that is spread throughout one's whole life, 
leads to definite precepts, which taken together constitute the natural moral 
law.
3.4: The Epistemic Requirement
i. Practical Reason and the Source of Moral Standards
Aquinas differentiates two basic ends of reason. One end is truth in 
speculative matters; the other is truth with respect to action. Accordingly, 
though he treats reason as one basic power, he distinguishes between the
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speculative and the practical reason, where the former is concerned with 
purely theoretical issues and the latter with action, i.e., knowledge of various 
courses of action. All human beings possess practical reason, which 
essentially means that each human being can reason about what to do, which 
is the process of bringing one's knowledge to bear on matters of action. As 
we saw in the previous section, there is a basic principle that guides all 
practical reasoning, which is that good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
avoided. Aquinas contends that this principle is self-evident to all people in 
that it is based on the nature of the will as seeking happiness. Hence, the 
reason, whose function is to present to the will objects of choice must present 
objects that appear good or necessary in the avoidance of evil in order to 
motivate the will, or grab its attention, so to speak.
The problem that creates the need for ethics, according to the 
eudaimonists, is that not everything that may appear good, is really good.
Just because something may appear to a person as an object that would 
contribute to happiness in some way, that object may not be something that 
actually does contribute to one's overall flourishing. Aquinas handles the 
method of discerning real from apparent good through the sophisticated 
process involving natural inclinations and reason, which we saw in the 
previous section. The upshot of his method for my present purposes is that 
because reason and natural inclinations are common to all people, all people 
have access to the resulting moral standards. Aquinas insists that, "all men 
know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the
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natural law" (l-ll, 93, 2). At the absolute minimum, according to Aquinas,
everybody knows basic moral standards.
Because the source of moral standards is within human nature itself,
each and every person seems to meet the epistemic requirement for self-
governance to some degree. However, Aquinas clouds the picture somewhat
when he takes up the issue of very specific cases that require subtle and
exacting moral distinctions.
The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent 
matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, 
although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we 
descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter 
defects...But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the 
same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general 
principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it 
is not equally known to all.
It is evident that, as regards the general principles whether of 
speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, 
and equally known by all...But as to the proper conclusions of the 
practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, 
where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true 
for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a 
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored 
to tlieir owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may 
happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore 
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance if they are 
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this 
principle will be found to fail the more according as we descend further 
into detail...
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general 
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. 
But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of 
those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, 
both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it 
may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles..., and as 
to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil 
habit, or an evil disposition of nature... (l-ll, 94, 4).
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A person's ability to know what to do in certain circumstances may be 
impaired due to a combination of the two factors of the uniqueness of the 
situation and ignorance of the morally relevant features of the situation on the 
part of the person himself. Aquinas puts considerable effort into parsing out 
the problem of ignorance-in this case moral ignorance, which is the lack of 
appropriate moral knowledge-and its effect on the ability to self-govern, 
ii. Ignorance and Involuntariness
In virtue of being master of his actions, a person can and should direct, 
lead, and govern himself in the pursuit of happiness. However, a person can 
master his acts only insofar as those acts are voluntary. Hence, Aquinas, 
again following Aristotle, carefully separates the voluntary from the 
involuntary. In the course of this analysis, Aquinas considers the issue of 
ignorance as an impediment to voluntariness, and therefore self-governance. 
As he puts it, "if ignorance causes involuntariness, it is insofar as it deprives 
one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition for voluntariness" (l-ll, 6,8).
Aquinas reviews two types of ignorance directly relevant to my 
argument, which he terms consequent and antecedent ignorance, each type 
relative to an act of the will. Explaining the nature of consequent ignorance, 
Aquinas notes.
Ignorance is consequent to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance 
itself is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in accordance with 
the two aforesaid modes of voluntary. First, because the act of the will 
is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to 
know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not t)e 
withheld from sin...And this is called af/iecfed/gnorance. Secondly, 
ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it regards that which one can 
and ought to know: for in this sense not to act and not to w/// are said to
106
be voluntary, as stated above. And ignorance of this kind happens, 
either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to 
consider;-this is called /gnorance of ew/cho/ce, and arises from some 
passion or habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the 
knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the 
general principles of law, which one ought to know, is voluntary, as 
being due to negligence.-Accordingly, if in either of these two ways, 
ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply. 
Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch 
as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which 
movement would not be, if there were knowledge (l-ll, 6, 8).
This type of ignorance is significant in that while it does impair a person's
ability to act voluntarily, and thereby impairs or restricts self-governance, it is
the result of an earlier choice or choices not to attend to considerations that
would have led to the appropriate knowledge. Moreover, those
considerations were within this person's epistemic range. Aquinas notes that
negligence of this type may result from a poor habit or untempered passion.
There are two points I wish to single out that are relevant to the
epistemic requirement. First, this type of ignorance does not count against
the requirement of epistemic access to appropriate moral standards in that it
is not a deficiency in a person's capacity that leads to the ignorance, but
rather a person's choice. Secondly, the possibility of voluntary ignorance or
negligence shows that a person through poor self-governance can actually
over time lose a great deal of ability to govern himself. Plato illustrated that
self-govemance is a concept that admits of degrees in his analysis of the
degeneration of the city/individual. Aquinas recognizes the same
phenomenon, which is why he so strongly cautions against forms of behavior
that undermine one's own capacities and ability to self-govern.
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Antecedent ignorance concerns a lack of knowledge for which a
person is not responsible.
Ignorance is anfecedenf to the act of the will when it is not voluntary, 
and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will othen/vise. 
Thus a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which 
he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he 
would not do, if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, 
after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming 
along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by.
Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply (l-ll, 6, 8).
The example Aquinas gives to illustrate this type of ignorance does not
really capture the element of an epistemic deficiency, but rather bad luck.
More precisely, the epistemic deficiency in this case results from bad luck.
The archer took precautions, but still lacked relevant knowledge. But this
type of ignorance is what causes a person to be at a loss about what to do in
very unique circumstances. Also, it is the type of ignorance that a child may
have prior to receiving appropriate instruction and education, which is why,
incidentally, that Aquinas espouses good moral education from an early age.
If a child receives appropriate instruction, his intellectual capacities will be
further developed, thus promoting a solid and sound epistemic capacity for
self-govemance.
Regarding the case of an adult who, though otherwise knowledgeable 
in moral matters, finds himself in a unique situation where the knowledge of 
an appropriate course of action is elusive, this individual may be in a position 
where he might defer to the judgment of a person with greater moral wisdom. 
If a decision must be made, the ignoreuit person might be morally required to 
act in the way specified by the more experienced individual. For instance.
108
take the case Aquinas presents earlier concerning returning another person's 
possession. If the circumstances are unusual, say the owner intends to use 
the thing in question in a destructive way, then the borrower may be confused 
as to the best course of action, even if he understands that it is typically 
appropriate to return borrowed goods. If the borrower has an opportunity to 
seek the counsel of a wiser individual and follow his advice, the borrower 
should do so.
Aquinas elaborates on other epistemic issues when he treats the virtue 
of practical reasoning, i.e., prudence (prudenf/a, translation of Greek 
phrones/s). I have elected to forgo considering those points here, since I will 
treat the issues at length when I focus on the authority element in Aquinas' 
account of self-govemance. From the foregoing analysis, however, we see 
that Aquinas strongly endorses the notion that all people, in virtue of their 
natural inclinations and practical reasoning, have considerable moral 
knowledge. Only when faced with unusual and unique circumstance, which 
by definition are rare, do some people fail to have the appropriate knowledge 
necessary to act. So Aquinas' account of self-govemance includes an 
epistemic component, and thereby his account meets that particular 
requirement set forth by Schneewind.
3.5: The Motivational Requirement
Aquinas is equally concerned with issues of motivation as he is with those of 
moral knowledge for self-governance. As I have explained, central to
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Aquinas' moral theory is the idea that human beings share in divine 
providence by actively governing and directing themselves to the end of 
happiness. Self-govemance is made possible in part through voluntary 
action, which in turn is dependent on knowledge. Aquinas recognizes that all 
people possess sufficient knowledge for directing themselves through typical 
situations. Yet he is somewhat less optimistic when it comes to the average 
person motivating himself to do what is appropriate, but Aquinas remains 
optimistic even in this.
He believes that everybody has the essential capacities required for 
self-motivation, but that sub-standard moral education or repetitive choices of 
a poor nature can render these capacities so ill-formed that external 
reinforcements, such as the threat of punishment or promise of reward, may 
be needed to prompt certain people to act appropriately. However, allow me 
to underscore that such external reinforcements are not the norm. The typical 
adult person is more than able to initiate and carry through on an action 
through purely internal motivational sources.
I. Natural Appetites
Aquinas' anthropological and psychological account provides answers 
to several questions pertaining to the issue of motivational sources. The 
sensitive appetite, which is comprised of the concupiscible and irascible 
desires, is hard-wired to seek objects that are necessary for self-preservation 
and bodily well being. Similarly, the rational appetite (the will) is hard-wired to 
seek overall flourishing of the body and soul. Because ethical precepts serve
no
only to guide a person to maximal happiness and these precepts and their 
happiness-guiding function are knowable to all people, human beings 
possess not only internal sources of motivation, but also these sources by 
nature are appropriately directed. In other words, a person has a head-start 
on appropriate behavior given the natural tendencies of her desires.
Recall that in Aquinas' account of our sensitive nature, reason does 
have some, but not total, control over the sensitive passions and emotions 
that contribute to motivation. He contends that reason rules with a politic or 
royal power, as opposed to a despotic power. A king rules over free men with 
political power in that his subjects have the ability to not submit to his rule, 
whereas, despotic power is absolute and none may resist it. "But the intellect 
or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: 
because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it 
can resist the commands of reason" (I, 81, 3). This dynamic between reason 
and emotion^ is largely responsible, on Aquinas' picture, for preventing 
people from always acting appropriately and achieving happiness.
The passions move a person to real goods, e.g., food, drink, 
intercourse, etc., but their movement is, by definition in this case, non- 
rational. The passions blindly, but potentially intensely, propel a person 
towards a given end. If left unchecked or unmoderated by reason, the 
movement of the passions could and most likely would interfere with the 
process of rational choice and action. This is to say that unhindered passions 
would undermine a person's ability to self-govem. For this reason, Aquinas
54 Here I mean only Aquinas' notion of sensitive emotions.
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methodically outlines the process by which the sensitive passions may be
best cultivated by reason with the dual aim of preventing them from interfering
with self-governance and of developing them to best contribute to radonal
self-govemance. So, through practice, a person is able to develop habits in
the sensitive nature so as to cause the passions to reliably tend towards
certain kinds of objects in specific ways, so as to not undermine, but rather,
aid rational choice. Aquinas discusses this dual aim of sensitive cultivation in
the following passage.
But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the 
sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that 
his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is 
founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, 
according as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore 
no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral 
good that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law 
of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as 
stated above, it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that 
the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good 
and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of 
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect 
to his will, but also in respect to his sensitive appetite (l-ll, 24, 3).
Aquinas builds upon this description by introducing the moral virtues.
ii. Moral Virtues
A person, through consciously acting in certain ways, can develop 
habits, which are qualities that dispose one to act in characteristic ways.
Good habits are included in the class of moral virtues, while bad habits in the 
class of moral vices. The particular moral virtues that I want to treat expressly 
are those relating to the sensitive passions/appetite. Notice in the next 
passage that Aquinas makes claims about the relationship between certain
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virtues and the passions that are similar to his claims eibout rational
motivation and the passions.
But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive 
appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are atx)ut the passions as 
about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for 
this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the 
sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue 
to deprive powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but 
to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their 
proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their 
due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper 
regulated movement (l-ll, 59, 5).
The process that is emerging is one in which reason begins to exercise 
the control that it does possess over the passions thereby training them to 
move or desire things in determinate ways. Through this process, reason's 
range of control effectively increases in that passional movement is more 
restricted to what reason commands. Through the virtuous habits, the 
passions motivate in tandem with reason so as to prompt and sustain the 
activity that reason chooses.
Aquinas, through his endorsement of this process of sensitive 
cultivation, affirms his commitment to the eudaimonistic self-governance 
tradition's espousal of the necessity of self-control and related notions to the 
exercise of self-govemance. Socrates and Plato heralded self-control as the 
key virtue in paving the way for psychological development and resulting self- 
govemance. Aristotle prized equally both courage and moderation, making 
both qualities necessary to the full actualization of the non-rational capacities 
of the soul. Aquinas adopts Aristotle's account into his own. For Aquinas,
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two key virtues are needed to develop the capacities relevant to one's
sensitive nature.
The irascible and concupiscible powers...can be considered as 
participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural 
aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible and concupiscible 
power can t)e the subject of human virtue; for, in so far as it 
participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to 
these powers we must needs assign virtues (l-ll, 56, 4).
The particular virtues needed for this task are temperance and courage
(forf/WOyl.
For the need of putting order of reason into the passions is due to their 
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions 
inciting to something against reason; and then the passions need a 
curb, which we call Temperance. Secondly, by the passions 
withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g., through fear 
of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which 
reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is Fod/We (I- 
11,61,2).
These virtues, which each and every person can acquire through 
practice, enable us to overcome the latent difficulties of having bodily desires 
and emotions, which can underpin motivation, not wholly under our control. 
The moral virtues, particularly temperance and courage, perfect the t)odily 
desires and sensitive nature so that those desires contribute to the motivation 
of the particular action that the reason and will choose to perform. Hence, 
human beings, on Aquinas' picture, have the necessary internal sources of 
motivation to prompt and sustain action without the need for external 
reinforcement. Aquinas' account thus meets the motivational requirement for 
self-govemance.
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3.6: The Authority Requirement
i. Platonic Biconditional
Throughout the eudaimonistic self-governance tradition, the individual 
theorists have affirmed in some form what I call the Platonic biconditional, 
which states that fully possessing the psychological capacities requisite for 
self-govemance is a necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of 
the proper authority to exercise self-governance. Plato's version seems to be 
captured in this strong form of fully possessing the capacities relevant to self- 
governance. Other theorists weaken the initial clause concerning the 
possession of relevant psychological capacities by affirming proper authority 
even if those capacities are not perfectly developed or actualized. On this 
weaker version, individuals may possess the rightful authority to govern their 
own lives in virtue of adequate psychological capacities, though other 
individuals may have capacities superior to the former. In whichever form, 
the principle states that if a person’s capacities are sufficiently developed to 
some threshold set within the theory, then that person has a legitimate moral 
claim to exercise these capacities through self-governance. Further, a person 
cannot possess the proper moral authority to exercise self-governance unless 
he has the requisite capacities.
Aquinas also endorses this principle, though in its weaker form. As a 
result, he places a great deal of emphasis on the nature of the psychological 
capacities in question, diagnosing how the capacities may be neglected and 
ill-cultivated, and suggesting practical techniques of promoting optimal
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development and use of the capacities. I tried to accentuate his emphases
on such capacities in the preceding sections. The way in which Aquinas
proceeds to develop his account of the authority requirement for self-
govemance continues in this manner, focusing most notably on the cultivation
of practical reason and its corresponding virtue, prudence (pmdenfâ).
Aquinas distinguishes among the virtues by reference to the part or
capacity of human nature to which the virtue pertains. So, for instance,
courage pertains to the irascible appetites or emotions, while temperance to
the concupiscible.
For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz., the 
power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by 
Prudence; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, 
the will, subject of Jusf/ce, the concupiscible faculty, subject of 
Temperar?ce, and the irascible faculty, subject of Pbrfrfude (l-ll, 61, 3).
Prudence is the virtue that corresponds to and perfects practical reason.
Reason^ works best, or is most fully actualized when accompanied by
prudence. For Aquinas virtues are qualities that are not so much inherently
good, but rather good-making qualities following Aristotle's "virtue is that
which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise" (/VE, II, 6). The
virtuous habit effects this goodness by enabling the capacity to which it refers
to thrive.
Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the 
power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, 
which the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose 
(l-ll, 56, 6).
55 Henceforth, by 'reason' I mean 'practical reason.'
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The upshot of these considerations is that when Aquinas analyzes the 
virtue of prudence, he is simultaneously offering a detailed account of how 
practical reason best functions. My argument in this section is going to 
employ Aquinas' account of prudence and reason as strong evidence that he 
meets the authority requirement for self-govemance. 
ii. Prudence and Practical Reason
Prudence is the process of reasoning well about matters of action and, 
in conjunction with the virtues considered above, of performing the best 
course of action.
Prudence is ngM reason app//edfo aof/on...Hence that which is the 
chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of 
prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is fo fa/re counse/, 
which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry...The 
second act is to yudpe of whaf one has d/scovered, and this is an act of 
the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to 
action, goes further, and its third act is to command, which act consists 
in applying to action the things counseled and judged (ll-ll, 47, 8).
Moreover, Aquinas links prudence to all sorts of abilities inherent in human
nature.
In this way, eight [things] may be taken as parts of prudence...namely, 
memory, reason/ng, ondersfandrng, docr/rfy and shrewdness: while the 
three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge 
to action, namely, foresrghf, crrcumspecfron, and card/on. The reason 
of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may be 
observed in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge 
itself, which, if it be of the past, is called memory, if of the present, 
whether contingent or necessary, is called undersfandrng or 
rnfeZ/rgence. Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge which is caused 
either by teaching, to which pertains docr/rfy, or by d/scovery.. .Thirdly, 
the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things known to 
knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to reasonrrrg. 
And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have three 
conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this 
belongs to foresrghf; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of the
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matter in hand, and this belongs to c/ruumspecf/on; thirdly, to avoid 
obstacles, and this belongs to caut/or? (ll-ll, 48, 1).
Thus, prudence is the virtue whereby a person consults his moral knowledge,
applies that knowledge to the given situation, and then initiates the most
appropriate action. In short, prudence is simply the adept exercise of the
psychological capacities relevant to self-govemance. In fact, Aquinas himself
terms prudence "the government of oneself (ll-ll, 47,10)^. For Aquinas,
then, there is a specific virtue of governing oneself, whereby the activity of
prudence is not only the exercise but the best possible exercise of self-
governance in that actions truly conducive to happiness are undertaken.
Also, prudence has a status of priority relative to all other moral virtues.
Now it is clear from what has been said that the cause and root of 
human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the 
reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues...in so far as it 
partakes of the reason (l-ll, 66,1).
Prudence, the virtue of self-governance, possesses a special status in
the moral life because it enables a person to make the best possible use of
reason. Moreover, because reason is part of human nature, all persons have
reason and thereby the authority to self-rule.
Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly 
to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be 
prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing...Since, 
however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in 
ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately 
competent to have prudence (ll-ll, 47,12).
^  y/detur quod prudenda non se exfendaf ad reg/men mu/dfud/n/s, sad so/um ad 
regfmen su/ /ps/us. Here Aquinas makes the point that not only does prudence 
concerning governing oneself, but the same generic virtue applies to the manner in 
which a political leader may best exercise his governance of the state.
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Aquinas recognizes the capacity of reason as the source of the proper
authority to self-rule. Since everybody has reason, all people have the proper
authority to cultivate prudence, which is synonymous with self-governance.
Hence, all people have the proper authority to govern themselves. Aquinas
affirms reason's authority conferring role in the opening question on ethics in
the Summa 7??eo/op/ca.
Those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an 
end; because they have domination over their actions through their 
free-will, which is the ^cu/fy of w/// and reason...Consequently, it is 
proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing and leading 
itself to the end (l-ll, 1,2).
Properly speaking then, the capacity of reason, not God, confers the 
proper authority for the exercise of self-governance. For Aquinas, God gives 
to each individual person the capacity of reason, but God cannot strip a 
person of the authority to self-govern without removing reason itself, as 
reason and such authority are inseparable. This is to say that the authority 
requirement is met in virtue of the possession of the requisite psychological 
capacities rooted in reason. The notion that such authority and capacities 
could be separate is foreign to his thought.
As it tums out, the way in which Aquinas structures his moral theory is 
such that he begins with the appropriateness of the rational person to govern 
himself. He proceeds to identify the capacities necessary for this activity of 
self-govemance, and he notes that those capacities are common to all 
people. He shows that through a person's natural inclinations and rational 
reflection on those inclinations moral standards are knowable. Furthermore,
119
through the cultivation of emotions and desires, a person may develop 
internal motivational sources so as to prompt and sustain appropriate activity. 
Finally, all people, in virtue of possessing reason, have the right to cultivate 
the virtue of prudence, which is the virtue characterized as the activity of 
governing oneself.
III. Summary
Aquinas' account of self-governance meets all three conditions, as 
implied by Schneewind, which jointly suffice for a minimally acceptable 
account of self-governance. I therefore conclude that self-governance was 
neither a theoretical notion new to the modern period nor was its centrality to 
moral theory original with the moderns. Far from being an obedience-based 
conception, Aquinas' moral account prizes self-governance as the central 
feature.
3.7: Moral Obligation
Aquinas includes a robust notion of self-governance in his ethical account. 
However, it does not follow from this inclusion that he precludes a notion of 
morally acceptable obedience. Rather, obedience plays a role in his ethics, 
even to the point of being a virtue, where v/rfu connotes strength and power. 
His account of the nature and role of obedience is important to my project for 
a couple of reasons. Schneewind construes Aquinas' morality as obedience- 
based as opposed to based on self-governance. I have already countered 
the gist of that interpretation. However, I believe by locating and explaining
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the role that obedience does perform in Aquinas, any lingering ambiguities 
should be resolved. Secondly, my motivation for explaining and defending 
this interpretation of Aquinas is in part to reveal some of the advantages that 
his account of ethics and self-governance have relative to other historical 
theories. His account of the relationship between self-governance and 
obedience constitutes one such advantage for contemporary thought.
Aquinas maintains that human beings are morally obligated to perform 
certain actions and develop certain character traits while avoiding other 
actions and traits. His justification of moral obligation underpins his concept 
and defense of morally appropriate obedience. Hence, before addressing 
obedience itself, I wish to focus on his notion of obligation.
I. History of Obligation and Self-Governance Revisited 
As mentioned in 2.6, iv, Kant does not think that full self-govemance is 
compatible with moral obligation unless the source of the obligation is intemal 
to a person. If the source of moral obligation were external, then the morally 
obliged would out of moral necessity have to submit to the authority or will of 
another person or group of persons. In effect, the morally obliged person 
would not truly be governing himself but instead be governed by another.
I also mentioned in that section that ethicists in the modern natural law 
tradition and others did affirm the possibility of self-govemance with an 
external source of moral obligation, that source t)eing God's will. So, 
historically at least, affirming a certain source of moral obligation does not 
constitute a necessary presupposition for self-govemance. Nevertheless, I
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think that there is minimally a strong pr/ma reason for holding that true 
self-governance is incompatible with a source of moral obligation that lies 
outside a person's own capacities. Kant is essentially correct in thinking that 
if the will of another person represents the ultimate reason why the obliged 
must submit, then the obliged is not governing her own life.
I am confident that the three conditions for self-govemance outlined 
previously represent necessary conditions and jointly sufficient for a minimally 
acceptable account. I now propose a corollary bolstering such an account. 
For moral obligation to be compatible with self-govemance then the following 
condition must obtain. The source of that obligation must in some substantial 
way be internal or reducible to a person's capacities,
ii. Aquinas' Anthropology Revisited
Aquinas' characterization of the will as a rational appetite provides the 
key to understanding his notion of moral obligation. The rational appetite is 
the source of a person’s ability to direct her own activity in that it bestows the 
capacity to choose one way or another. However, the will of necessity 
desires the end or goal approphate to it. The will necessarily seeks 
happiness (beaf/fudo), which Aquinas contends is the ultimate good. He 
states,
Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the 
general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man desires 
happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect 
good, as stated above. But since good is the object of the will, the 
perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. 
Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that 
one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires (l-ll, 5, 8).
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As noted earlier, this fact about human nature structures Aquinas' entire 
ethical account, as it had for the previous contributors to the eudaimonist 
ethical tradition.
With this notion of the will as rational appetite in mind, Aquinas 
construes the notion of moral precepts as principles that serve to distinguish 
what is truly good and hence conducive to happiness from what is only 
apparently good and hence a hindrance to happiness. The upshot of this is 
that if Aquinas' ethical theory is built up from the foundation of the will as 
rational appetite that of necessity seeks happiness, then Aquinas' notion of 
moral obligation must also be something that is dependent upon the nature of 
the will.
Hi. Rational Appetite as Source of Moral Obligation
Moral obligation arises from the twofold consideration of the will's
necessary desire for happiness and the fact, for Aquinas, that there are
action-guiding principles whose function it is to demarcate true from merely
apparent goods. I can best represent the obligation generated from these two
notions through the means of a modus ponens argument.
PI : If human beings desire to be happy, then they ought to perform 
those actions and develop those character traits that are conducive to 
happiness and avoid those actions and traits that are a hindrance to 
happiness.
P2: All human beings desire happiness in virtue of the rational will.
C: Therefore, human beings ought (have a moral obligation) to 
perform those actions and develop those character traits that are 
conducive to happiness and avoid those actions and traits that are a 
hindrance to happiness.
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The consequent of premise 1 is a summary of Aquinas' account of 
human nature with respect to action. There are certain activities, objects, and 
states that are really good for human beings. That is, there are certain 
activities, objects, and states that produce or lead to happiness. The means 
of obtaining them are sufficiently constant as to be summarized in terms of 
precepts or principles, namely the principles of natural moral law. The 
antecedent of the same premise is automatically discharged in virtue of the 
rational will, which of necessity seeks happiness. Hence, all people have an 
obligation to perform the appropriate actions.
The obligation, though, does not arise from some source external to a 
person. It is not something imposed from without, but rather generated from 
within. The source of moral obligation, on Aquinas' account, is intemal to 
each person in that it is reducible or justified in terms of each person's 
psychological capacities, namely rational will. In sum, Aquinas account of 
ethics meets the corollary condition connected to self-governance, which is 
for moral obligation to be compatible with self-governance, the source of that 
obligation must in some substantial way be intemal or reducible to a person's 
capacities.
As I mentioned above, I believe that Kant is right to hold that for self- 
governance to be realizable, any obligation to abide by moral standards must 
in some substantial way issue from a source intemal to a person. His theory 
accounts for this by affirming that by the rational will legislating the law, a 
person imposes the obligation on herself. I find it both interesting and
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significant that both Kant and Aquinas construe the source of moral obligation 
in terms of the rational will. However, their accounts are by no means 
identical. For Aquinas, a person does not legislate to herself the moral law. 
Rather, the moral law is something that each person can discover, but not 
legislate.^  ^ In deference to Schneewind, perhaps Kant does invent autonomy 
in the sense of self-legislation. However, I am not sure what is so historically 
significant about Kantian autonomy given that antecedent theories, like 
Aquinas', had robust conceptions of self-govemance with intemal accounts of 
moral obligation.
iv. Obligation to Self-Govern
As we saw in chapter 3, Aquinas believes that the only way to achieve
happiness^ is to actively direct and govern oneself. Self-governance is fully
realized in the virtue of prudence. In Aquinas' response to the question
"whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man" we find both another strong
affirmation of eudaimonistically construed self-governance and a strong hint
regarding the obligation to govem one's own life. He considers an objection
and offers a response.
Objection 2. Further, /f /s by prudence fbaf we are of pood counse/, as 
stated in Efb/c. v/. 5 .^  But man can act not only from his own, but 
also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need 
prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the 
counsels of prudent men.
[Aquinas'] Reply. When a man does a good deed, not of his own 
counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect.
57 Rhonheimer interprets Aquinas as saying that although we do not self-legislate the
law, we do, in a sense, create the law for ourselves by an act of self-promulgation. 
^Here I mean the happiness attainable in this life.
™ The reference is to Aristotle's A/icomachean Ethics.
12:)
as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. 
Wherefore, if he [does such] a good deed, he does not do well simply; 
and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life (l-ll, 57, 5).
Happiness/flourishing both presupposes and includes the governing of one's
own actions through one's own counsel and motivation. Because we have
already determined, for Aquinas, that we have a moral obligation to do those
things that are truly conducive to happiness, it follows from the above that we
have an obligation to govem our own lives. Specifically, we have the
obligation to govem ourselves well.
Aquinas supports his contention of the obligatory nature of self-
govemance by considering the wrongful nature of not acting with prudence.
He does this in the context of discussing imprudence and why it is wrong.
Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first as a privation...Taken as a 
privation, imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can 
and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of
a man’s negligence in striving to have prudence (11-11, 53, 1).
It is wrong not to cultivate prudence because in so doing, a person 
undermines both his ability to self-govem and his potential to t)e happy. In 
summary, for Aquinas, all people have a moral obligation to do certain things, 
including goveming themselves well. The justification for that obligation 
fundamentally derives from the common characteristics of human nature and 
the means for achieving happiness.
3.8: Obedience
Human beings are capable of self-govemance. Moreover, we have a moral 
obligation to govem ourselves well in that such fruitful govemance is
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necessary for happiness. Aquinas does not maintain that the fact that we are 
self-governing precludes obedience as a proper facet of morality. However, 
he does insist on two main points that underscore his account of obedience. 
Obedience is morally necessary for the sake of best securing happiness for 
individuals. Secondly, morally appropriate obedience must presuppose self- 
govemance.
i. The Social and Political Nature of Humanity
The capacities for self-governance are inherent and natural to every
person. In addition, it is, for Aquinas, natural and necessary that people live
together, not simply in terms of physical proximity, but in an organized society
or community. Without the presence of a community, individuals would be
hard pressed to meet even the most basic bodily necessities, let alone to
flourish. In the following passage from his political treatise On K/hgsh/p, he
describes and defends this account of human nature.
But man is by nature a political and social animal. Even more than 
other animals he lives in groups. This is demonstrated by the 
requirements of his nature. Nature has given to other animals food, 
furry covering, teeth, and horns and claws-or at least speed of flight-as 
means to defend themselves. Man however, is given none of these by 
nature. Instead he had been given the use of his reason to secure all 
these things by the work of his hands. But a man cannot secure all 
these by himself, for a man cannot adequately provide for his life by 
himself.. .Therefore if it is natural for man to live in association with 
others, there must be some way for them to be governed. For if many 
men were to live together and each to provide what is convenient for 
himself, the group would break up unless one of them had the 
responsibility for the good of the group...(On K/ngsh/p, 1).^
Such natural association affects the way in which a person should best
exercise her practical reason or prudence. Moreover, according to Aquinas,
60 Aquinas, Thomas. On K/ngshÿ).
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the sphere of political governance, which is mandated by human nature's
social and political aspects, lies outside the scope of the virtue of prudence as
it pertains to the government of oneself. The immediate concern of personal
prudence is the good of the individual. Aquinas believes a special form of
prudence, for which he uses the term "political prudence," is necessary for the
government of the community. The proper object of political prudence is the
common, as opposed to the individual's, good.
In the following passage, Aquinas considers the objection that perhaps
political prudence is not necessary.
Objection 3. Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each 
person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. 
Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called 
political.
[Aquinas'] Reply. Man directs himself by prudence commonly so 
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which
we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good {S.T. II-II, 
50, 2).
Society is necessary for advancing the welfare of individual human beings. 
Political prudence is necessary for securing the common good of that society, 
which in turn creates the possibility of each person achieving her individual 
good.
It is this dynamic that arises from the social and political dimension of 
human nature that establishes the moral appropriateness of obedience on 
Aquinas' account. If there were no common authority and individuals 
governed their lives by personal prudence and nothing else, then the common 
good would be unobtainable. Such a consequence would not l)e as dire as
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the Hobbesian state of nature in that personal prudence places some checks
on force, acquisition, and raw self-interest. But there would remain an
unstable dynamic in personal relations that would prevent the benefits of
large-scale cooperation and social interaction. In eudaimonistic terms, the
lack of common authority would lead to the lack of individual happiness.
Aquinas maintains that sustaining civil society and thus promoting and
protecting the associated social benefits entails that certain individuals will
possess political authority. Such political authority requires the obedience of
other citizens, at least to some extent. Aquinas addresses the nature and
scope of this obedience below.
Since by nature all men are equal, [an individual] is not bound to obey 
another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in 
those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. 
Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children 
their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in 
the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal 
of actions and humein affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior 
within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his 
general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters 
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in 
matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; 
and so forth (II-II, 105, 5).
Taking the above passages together, we find a general argument
concerning the justification of obedience. The argument runs as follows:
P I: Human beings necessarily desire happiness as their end.
P2: Human happiness requires living in societies.
P3: Living in societies requires that certain people have authority over 
other people.
C: Obeying proper authority serves each person's end of happiness. 
Moreover, each person indirectly desires obedience in these cases.
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We desire happiness, but we cannot obtain happiness without living in a 
community with others. In order to sustain and contribute to the health of the 
community, political leaders and other members of the government possess 
authority to direct certain spheres of human affairs. This authority underpins 
the moral appropriateness of obedience. In short, our desire for happiness 
serves as the ultimate justification for obedience.
Nevertheless, as indicated in the passage above, Aquinas does not 
hold that any and all responses of obedience would be appropriate. Only 
when the authority is proper and ultimately conducive to happiness is a 
person bound to obey. Other forms of obedience are harmful, such as the 
instances within personal affairs described by Aquinas.
ii. Obedience Sanctioned by Self-Governance 
Aquinas’s basic justification for obedience rests upon his 
understanding of human nature and happiness. He proceeds to specify the 
conditions under which an act of obedience is justified. He does this through 
a consideration of a person's appropriate exercise of self-govemance. This is 
to say that in addition to the external justification of obedience brought about 
through the community obligations outlined above, Aquinas adds an intemal 
justification which mandates that for obedience to be appropriate, an obedient 
person, through his own capacities, must agree that such an act is justified.
He explains that each person has a sufficient share of political prudence to 
understand when such an act of obedience is necessary for the common 
good, and hence contributive to one's own happiness.
130
Men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the 
commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their 
free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in 
them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; 
and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political (II- 
II, 50, 2).
Aquinas' development of the notion of political govemance and 
obedience is parallel to his development of God's providence over rational 
creatures. The explanation for the parallel turns on the corpmonality of the 
authority of reason in both instances. Recall that for Aquinas, humans have 
the authority to direct and govem themselves and thereby share in God's 
providence.
Of course, the result of [God's] rule is manifested differently in different 
beings, depending on the diversity of their natures. For some beings 
so exist as God's products that, possessing understanding, they bear 
His likeness and reflect His image. Consequently, they are not only 
ruled but are also rulers of themselves, in as much as their own actions 
are directed to a fitting end (SCG, III, 1, 4).
Moreover,
Furthermore, the [individual] rational creature is subject to divine 
providence in such a way that he is not only governed thereby, but is 
also able to know the rational plan of providence in some way. Hence, 
it is appropriate for him to exercise providence and government over 
other things. This is not the case with other creatures, for they 
participate in providence only to the extent of being subordinate to it. 
Through this possession of the capacity to exercise providence one 
may also direct and govern his own acts. So, the rational creature 
participates in divine providence, not only by being governed passively, 
but also by goveming actively, for he govems himself in his personal 
acts (III, 113, 5).
God does not control human beings so that we act blindly or without 
choice. Because we possess the capacity of reason, He gives to us the 
space to govem ourselves. Similarly, the same capacity of reason invests
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each person with the right and duty to govem his life with respect to political
authority. Due to the necessity of certain political obligations, some
obedience is necessary. But those acts of ot)edience are only appropriate
when the moral space for directing oneself in obeying a political superior is
safeguarded. In the event that laws and obligations are imposed that are not
just and hence do not meet the external justification for obedience, a person
is not morally bound to obey such laws.
Laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human 
good...either in respeôt of the end, as when an authority imposes on 
his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, 
but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory;-or in respect of the author, 
as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to 
him;-or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally 
on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like 
are acts of violence rather than laws...Wherefore such laws do not 
bind in conscience...(ST, l-ll, 96, 4).
Some laws may even possess the extemal justification for obedience in
general, but when due to changing social circumstances, each person is to
evaluate whether the law would be appropriate to obey.
Every law is directed to the common weal of men, and derives the 
force and nature of law accordingly...How it happens often that the 
observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the 
majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since 
then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the 
law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his 
attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the 
observance of that law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it 
should not be observed (l-ll, 96, 6).
In sum, obedience is morally justified when it is warranted extemally by 
social concems and intemally through a personal sanction by an exercise of 
self-govemance. The points of departure for Aquinas' ethical theory are the
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capacities of reason cind the accompanying rational will. These capacities, 
along with other anthropological considerations give to each person the ability 
to govem her own life. All other aspects of Aquinas' moral theory, including 
obedience, are built upon these considerations. Hence, to label Aquinas' 
account obedience-based, as Schneewind does, is unreasonable.
Obedience plays a role in Aquinas ethics, but it is not foundational, in fact 
moral obedience depends upon self-govemance for the legitimacy that it does 
possess.
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Chapter 4: The Rise of Obedience-Based Morality
There is one last question that I want to address concerning both 
Schneewind's historical account and my own. With self-govemance 
performing such a key role in Aquinas' account, why would Schneewind claim 
that the story of modern moral philosophy is one of reacting to and chipping 
away at an ensconced obedience-based moral tradition? The reason is that 
he overlooks or at least underplays both a significant shift in moral theory that 
occurred subsequent to Aquinas and specific consequences of this shift.
4.1 : Overview of Schneewind's Misinterpretation
in The /rrvenf/on of Autonomy, Schneewind tracks a change in medieval 
moral philosophy concerning the relation of moral principles to God. The 
move that occurred was away from intellectualism, the approach that 
characterizes ethical laws as separate (or separable) from God's will, to 
voluntarism, the approach which characterizes ethical norms as derived 
completely from God's will. Schneewind accomplishes a commendable task 
of tracing this change from the intellectualist Aquinas through and to the 
increasingly voluntarist positions of Scotus, Ockham, Luther, and Calvin. 
However, Schneewind fails to account for the underlying significance of this 
shift. Aquinas' intellectualism in part made possible the centrality of self- 
govemance to his overall ethical account. For instance, in Aquinas' theory, a 
person is able to know moral norms apart from divine revelation precisely 
because those norms are not totally contingent on God's will, and the source
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of those norms is in each person in virtue of natural inclinations and practical 
reason. In addition to intellectualism, Aquinas' account of the will and moral 
obligation play a key role in his notion of self-govemance. Subsequent 
thinkers re-conceive these notions as well.
Voluntarism, with its strong insistence that God's will is the source of 
the content of moral norms and the obligation to live by them, developed into 
a divine command ethical theory. In the divine command theories of the time, 
a person's primary moral response was one of simple obedience to the laws 
enjoined by God's will. Because moral laws were not based on reason, a 
person was not in a position to really understand them or know them apart 
from divine revelation. Also, because regulation of conduct and moral 
justification were based solely in God's will, a creation of conceptual space 
occurred whereby there could be an essential distinction between a person's 
psychological capacities and her authority to rightfully exercise them. 
Furthermore, connected to this change was the way the will itself was 
characterized.
These moves in ethical theory prompted theorists, e.g. Scotus, 
Ockham, Luther, and Calvin, to move away from self-govemance to that of 
obedience. Moreover, some ethicists like Suarez who considered themselves 
to be followers and commentators on Aquinas tended to include strong 
voluntaristic elements in their interpretations of Aquinas. I believe these later 
Thomists misled and continue to mislead historians about the nature of 
Aquinas' ethical account.
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In this chapter, I will first address in closer detail Scheewind's account 
of the shift from intellectualism to voluntarism and the early stages of the rise 
of what he calls modem natural law theory. My contention is that his account, 
though in many respects accurate, contains some subtle and not so subtle 
mistakes that call for correction. I believe that Scotus is the pivotal figure in 
the story of how divine command theory gained prominence. Consequently, I 
will treat his account of the human will and morality in some detail. In 
addition, I will draw out the significant differences between his and Aquinas' 
accounts. I will conclude by noting the presence of certain voluntaristic 
elements within later early modem Thomism and how these elements 
affected Schneewind's analysis of the origin and importance of self- 
govemance in the history of moral philosophy.
4.2: Schneewind's Account of the Rise of Voluntarism
Schneewind tracks the dramatic shift in the way medieval ethicists after 
Aquinas characterized the relationships between the will and the good and 
God and the moral law. Schneewind construes the change as one away from 
intellectualism to voluntarism, which it was. However, as I have maintained 
he fails to give adequate consideration to the simultaneous rise of divine 
command theory and new conceptions of the human will. Voluntarism and 
divine command theory could rightly be construed as two sides of the same 
coin, but, to extend the metaphor, they are different sides with separate 
characteristics. I wish to first summarize Schneewind's account of the rise of
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voluntarism. Then, I will offer my supplement to the history, showing how 
deficiencies in Schneewind's account relate to his interpretation of Aquinas 
and self-govemance.
i. Duns Scotus
Schneewind compares Aquinas' and Scotus' understandings of how
moral principles are related to God.
Aquinas, as I noted, held that the first principles of natural law are 
rational, and agreed with Cicero's view that right reason, in showing 
them to us, shows us principles that properly govern God's will as well 
as ours. Hence for Thomas, Duns Scotus says, "\what is commanded 
[in the Decalog] is not good merely because it is commanded, but 
commanded because it is good in itself." But for Duns Scotus the will 
is nobler than the intellect and is not tied by what the intellect can show 
it. He can appeal to the divine word for this view: Christ said that "With 
God all things are possible" (Mark 10:27). Hence it seems that God 
can will anything. Duns Scotus sees only one limit to God's will. God 
cannot will anything that goes against his own nature. Laws of nature, 
therefore, can require only what God could not reject without the self- 
contradiction in denying his own nature.^ ^
This understanding of God and the moral law has certain consequences with
respect to the status of moral principles, in this case the principles contained
in the decalogue.
It follows, Duns Scotus thinks, that only the first two commandments 
are genuine laws. They follow strictly from the necessary truth that if 
God exists, he alone is to be loved as God. Hence God could not will 
their opposite. But the commandments of the second table -  those 
concerning relations among humans -  do not follow in this way from 
any necessary truth.^
Scotus maintains that the moral principles concerning relations among 
human beings do turn out to contribute to the good of individuals, but that the
Schneewind, p. 23.
^  Schneewind, p. 23.
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ultimate goodness of these laws is derivable from the fact that God wills them.
Schneewind explains this in Euthyphronian prose.
Most so called laws, however, are on [Scotus'] view included under 
that name only by courtesy. Only those concerning the worship of God 
command something because it is good; the others make something 
good because they command it. They do not have any basis in prior 
goodness arising from the nature of what they command or the results 
of those actions. Consequently we could not infer anything about how 
we are to behave from any knowledge we might have about the nature 
of specific actions.^.
In other words, most moral principles, such as the one proscribing
murder, are changeable if God so wills it. For Aquinas, not even the
foundational principles concerning human relations were changeable by God.
Schneewind is careful and correct to point out that what motivates Scotus on
this point is the concem about the nature of God, specifically God's
omnipotence. Moreover, this concem extended far beyond Scotus, securing
the prominence of voluntarism for a couple of centuries.
The most basic consideration leading Duns Scotus to the voluntarist 
postion was the desire to maintain God's omnipotence. If all the 
precepts of the Decalog were genuine laws of nature, "true by reason 
of their terms," they would have to be true "even if, to assume the 
impossible, no act of willing existed." Then God's will would have to 
agree with them or be wrong, a limitation on God that Duns Scotus 
rejects.. .Omnipotence is secured, at the cost of making God's 
commands concerning the moral relations of human beings to one 
another an outcome of his arbitrary will. Luther and Calvin did not 
mind the cost. Voluntarism became an inescapable issue for later 
thinkers because of the decisive place they gave it in their moral 
theologies.^
How could God really be all-powerful if he were constrained by 
predetermined moral standards? Aquinas thought there was no real problem.
^  Schneewind, p. 24-25.
^  Schneewind, p. 25.
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He simply places such moral standards outside the scope of things that are 
changeable given antecedent considerations about human nature. Scotus 
found this account unacceptable. Moreover, eventually the early Reformers 
disagreed with the intellectualist picture as well, which made voluntarism the 
prominent manner by which to explain the relationship between God and the 
moral law.
ii. Luther and Reformation Moral Theology
Schneewind begins his account of Martin Luther by focusing on the
letter's account of the effects of sin on human capacities, and how God uses
the law to remedy these effects.
Although Luther grants that reason gives us knowledge of the law, he 
stresses, more emphatically than St. Thomas, the effects of sin in 
weakening our powers of reasoning, and the consequent importance of 
God's repromulgation of the laws through the Mosaic Decalog and 
Christ's teaching...the main point of the law is to convince us all that 
we are sinners, “to reveal unto a man his sin, his blindness, his misery, 
his impiety, ignorance, hatred and contempt of God, death, hell, the 
judgment and deserved wrath of God.” As long as we remain unaware 
of our actual condition we will be full of pride and presumption. But the 
natural laws, as repeated in the Decalog, “show us what we ought to 
do but do not give us the power to do it"...In this powerful statement 
Luther is not saying that we cannot behave externally as the laws 
require. We can indeed control our actions; but we cannot control the 
motives that lead us to do what the laws require...Works alone do not 
save. Only a right will does; and only those who are given grace can 
act from the right will.^
By way of commentary, I will say that this is the first full-fledged 
obedience-based moral theory found in Schneewind's account. Luther, in 
effect, denies all three requirements for self-govemance. Due to sin, we are 
hard-pressed to know what to do. Even once God reveals to us what to do.
65 Schneewind, p. 27.
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we still lack the approphate motivational sources to prompt action. Lastly, no
one, save God, possesses the proper authohty to self-rule. In addition to
denying self-govemance, Luther goes on to construe morality in terms that
seem to indicate nothing other than human obedience to a command that
really cannot be understood. I think this is significant given that Luther was
born over 200 years after Aquinas' death, thus showing the vast gulf between
the letter's ethics and the onset of a full-fledged prominent obedience
conception of morality.
To continue my account of Schneewind, Luther's voluntarism is the
next issue considered.
"What God wills is not hght because he ought or was bound so to will; 
on the contrary, what takes place must be right, because he so wills." 
Luther thus accepts a voluntarist position about God's commands, and 
accepts with it the conclusion that we can neither understand God nor 
judge his decisions.^
With the spread of the reformation and its associated moral theology,
voluntarism gained prominence. Morality's dictates, or the law, were
something changeable by God because His omnipotence demanded as
much. Moreover, moral principles derived their legitimacy and force through
God's will. The consequence of this was that if a person was to be morally
good, then her chief moral obligation was to obey God's commands.
ill. Suarez
Schneewind's interpretation of the thought of Suarez is especially 
important to my overall project. Suarez considered himself to be a Thomist. 
He was consciously thinking within the basic framework of Aquinas' thought.
66 Schneewind, p. 31,
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Moreover, Suarez is the only early modem Thomist" that Schneewind
considers. However, Suarez's ethical thought contains marked differences
from that of Aquinas. Now this is important in that some of these differences
pertain to classifying resultant ethical theories as obedience or self-
governance based. Suarez's ethics, I contend, in the end emphasizes
obedience more than it does self-govemance. It is no wonder, then, that
Schneewind classifies Suarez's moral theory as obedience-based. My
problem is that Schneewind projects certain elements of Suarez's natural law
moral theory into his interpretation of Aquinas, even though Aquinas never
includes those elements in his account. The key element to which I refer is
Suarez' notion of God's will and moral obligation. I will address this issue
after I have offered Schneewind's account of Suarez.
Schneewind begins his summary of Suarez by looking at the letter's
notion of the natural moral law and the obligation to obey the law.
There is no absolute necessity that law should exist. God is the only 
necessarily existing being. But once God created free rational beings, 
law is necessary because "an intellectual creature, by virtue of the very 
fact that he is a created being, has a superior to whose providence and 
control he is subject," and that control is exercised by law. In addition 
to being appropriate, law is useful. Created beings can tum to evil as 
well as to good, and laws are necessary to improve what they do to 
attain their divinely assigned end. Law, unlike advice or counsel, must 
involve the command of a superior.^
Suarez begins with Aquinas' framework for understanding the origin of the
content of the natural moral law.
Law must function to direct a community, and when we are considering 
natural law, we have in mind simply the community of rational 
agents...[Suarez's] central concem is the relations of intellect and will
67 Schneewind, p. 59.
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in constituting law. Law is made to direct action, so it must have a 
"demonstrative" function, showing us what is good and what bad for a 
rational nature. But it must also have a "preceptive" function. For "law 
does not merely enlighten, but also provides motive force and impels; 
and, in intellectual processes, the primary faculty of moving to action is 
the will."^
After addressing the origin of the content of law as something good for 
rational agents, Suarez focusing on the law's "preceptive" function. In the 
next passage, Schneewind shows how Suarez relates this function of the law 
to God.
Suarez's own view is a mediating position that he attributes to Thomas: 
"Not only does the natural law indicate what is good or evil, but 
furthermore, it contains its own prohibition of evil and command of 
good." Some things are naturally good for beings with a rational 
nature. But it is fitting that God, as "supreme Governor," should add 
his own command that we pursue them. Willing this as our govemor, 
he creates an obligation to act, while leaving us free not to do so. 
Natural law is thus preceptive because it includes God's command that 
we do good. Natural goodness provides the material for God's 
command and justifies it; the formality of command alone makes 
obligation supervene upon natural goodness.^
So, on Suarez's account, the natural law has two main features or
functions. The first feature is the law's "demonstrative" function. This refers
to the actual content of the law. The law demonstrates or instructs a person
with respect to a certain kind of action. The second feature is the law's
"preceptive" function. This refers to the law's obligating force. The former
function arises mainly through the notion of what is good for rational beings,
while the latter comes about by God's command.
68
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Schneewind, p. 60.
Schneewind, p. 61.
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iv. Suarez, Aquinas, and Schneewind
I have no contention with Schneewind's interpretation of Suarez insofar 
as he is explicating what the latter said and meant. I take issue only with 
Schneewind's implicit and explicit view that various aspects of Suarez's 
ethical theory are straightforward adoptions or extensions of Aquinas' 
thought. As I have stated, I believe some of those aspects are completely 
foreign to Aquinas. Specifically, Suarez believes that the "preceptive" 
function of the natural moral law, i.e., that characteristic of the law that 
obligates a person to perform or avoid types of action, arises solely from 
God's command.
Suarez's insistence that God's commands are the ultimate origin of 
moral obligation runs counter to Aquinas' position of the origin and 
justification of our obligation to follow the law. As I discussed in the last 
chapter, moral obligation, for Aquinas, is ultimately reducible to each person's 
own desire for happiness, i.e., the nature of the rational will itself. For Suarez, 
the moral response of a moral agent is ot)edience, namely obedience to 
natural law precepts that derive their obligating force from God's will. For 
Aquinas, on the other hand, the moral response is not reducible to obedience, 
but rather to actively seeking happiness, which on his account involves self- 
governance.
I believe that Schneewind is interpreting Aquinas' theory through 
Suarez's eyes. This leads Schneewind to place an emphasis on ot)edience 
and God's will that is not found in Aquinas' account. I think that the best
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explanation for this discrepancy is that Schneewind fails to understand the full 
extent of the shift that occurred between Aquinas and Scotus and reached its 
pinnacle in the 16**^  century. I believe a further comparison between Aquinas 
and Scotus should clarify the particular differences that so affected 
subsequent ethical theory.
4.3: Aquinas and Scotus Revisited
There are two elements in Scotus' ethical theory that I wish to explain further. 
The first aspect is his notion of the will as comprised of two basic inclinations. 
To be fair, Schneewind does mention and briefly describe this idea, and I will 
reflect his account in my own. However, Schneewind fails to account for the 
full significance of Scotus' view as it plays out in the narrative of self- 
governance and obedience-based moral philosophy. I will also explain how 
the combination of Scotus' notions of the will and the scope of God's 
omnipotence require a new understanding of moral authority, as embodied in 
the authority requirement in this project. In the moral tradition up through 
Aquinas, a person's right or authority to exercise self-govemance is, in effect, 
reducible to the possession of the relevant psychological capacities. Scotus's 
ethics, I submit, severs this connection.
I. The Will's Two Affections
Schneewind begins his overview of Scotus' account of the will by 
noting Scotus' general dissatisfaction with Aquinas' account of sin, namely a 
person's responsibility for a sinful act.
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Thomas's critics think he has a problem about explaining responsibility 
for sin. The intellectualist view seems to imply that we can act wrongly 
only if we fail to know what is good. But is our ignorance 
blameworthy?^^
Scotus believed that Aquinas' account of the will was too impoverished
to explain how a person could really be accountable for committing a sin. For
if a person always acts sub spec/es bon/, i.e., for the sake of some perceived
good, then how could that person be said to have intentionally committed an
evil action? Scotus thought that the only way around this problem was to
expand the will's capacities for choosing. He proposed that instead of the will
having only one basic inclination, it has two. Recall from my account of
Aquinas, that the will or rational appetite has one basic tendency or desire,
which is for fiappiness. Moreover, that basic desire underpins all of the will's
activity. Scotus offers his own alternative account within his discussion of
Lucifer’s first sin. Schneewind offers a concise summary of this discussion.
Lucifer's fall, Duns Scotus thinks, was due to an inordinate desire for 
his own happiness. Lucifer improperly or inordinately desired good for 
someone he loved or to whom he wished well. It could not have been 
God for whose good he had an inordinate desire, since God is himself 
so lovable that it is impossible to love him excessively. It is unlikely 
that Lucifer sought good for anyone else; so it must have been himself 
whom he loved to excess. Now how is this possible? The will 
naturally seeks the advantageous and, if only this aspect of the will is 
involved, seeks as much as possible...Duns Scotus thinks there is 
another aspect to the will. The will can seek what is just, not merely 
what is useful or pleasant. And justice puts a check on the extent to 
which one may properly seek the useful or the agreeable...Lucifer's 
sin, then, was not due to ignorance. It was a deliberate pursuit of a 
good he knew he ought not to pursue, and which he did not have to 
pursue. He was free to pursue a justly obtainable good instead.^ ^
^  Schneewind, p. 21. N.B. "intellectualism" in this passage does not refer to the 
way moral principles are related to God, but rather to a  person's motivational 
structure.
Schneewind, p. 22.
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By adding another essential inclination to the will, Scotus is able to
offer an alternative account of the origin and personal responsibility for sin.
The will's inclinations are the affection for the advantageous and the affection
for justice. Scotus distinguishes the two inclinations or affections through the
way they relate to an agent's own good or benefit.
Two affections may be assigned to the will, namely, the affection for 
justice and the affection for the advantageous...The affection for 
justice is nobler than the affection for the advantageous, understanding 
by "justice" not only acquired or infused justice, but also innate justice, 
which is the will's congenital liberty by reason of which it is able to will 
some good not oriented to self. According to the affection of what is 
advantageous, however, nothing can be willed save with reference to 
self. And this we would possess if only an intellectual appetite with no 
liberty followed upon intellectual knowledge, as sense appetite follows 
sense cognition. The only point I wish to make from this is the 
following. To love something in itself [or for its own sake] is more an 
act of giving or sharing and is a freer act than is desiring that object for 
oneself. As such it is an act more appropriate to the will, as the seat of 
this innate justice at least. The other act [of wanting something for 
oneself] pertains to the will Inasmuch as it has an affection for the 
advantageous (Ord/nafro III, suppl., dist. 46).^
For Scotus, the affection for the advantageous is basically equivalent
to Aquinas’ notion of the will as seeking happiness. The affection for justice
adds the dimension whereby a person can seek some object, not t)ecause it
is conducive to his happiness, but rather because "justice" demands we
respond to certain objects in certain ways, irrespective of our happiness. For
instance, to love someone, according to Scotus, I cannot simply incline
towards her merely insofar as she is conducive to my happiness. Rather, I
^  From Duns Scofus.' On the kV/// and Mora/;fy. All citations of Scotus are from this 
translation and source.
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must respond to her or be inclined to her for her own sake, i.e., insofar as she 
is an inherently good thing.
The specifics of the dynamic are not important for this project, but 
suffice it to say the interplay between these dual affections make personal 
responsibility for sin possible, according to Scotus. Schneewind, at this point 
in his overview, turns to God's omnipotence and Scotus' voluntarism, which I 
addressed in the previous section. However, I believe Schneewind would 
have benefited to delve further into Scotus' account. For Scotus believes that 
since the will has an affection not attributed to it by Aquinas, practical 
reasoning needs to be construed differently than on Aquinas' account.
Recall that the basic principle that governs practical reason on 
Aquinas' account is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided" (l-ll, 
94, 2). Scotus, on the other hand, insists that the basic principle is "God is to 
be loved" (Orcf/naf/o, III, 27, 2). For Scotus, the will's inclination to do "justice" 
to objects of intrinsic value commits practical reasoning to seek out objects in 
proportion to their respective degrees of value or goodness. Thus, practical 
reason, through an understanding of this hierarchy of value, can direct a 
person to such objects, and through the will's affection for justice, a person 
can properly love them. God, on this scheme, is the most valuable or good 
thing. Therefore, a person ought to love Him above all else, hence Scotus' 
basic principle.
Aquinas' view of practical reasoning is tied into his view of the will as a 
rational appetite with its basic inclination to seek what is good but where
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"good" means "conducive to the agent's happiness." Therefore the basic 
principle that directs the activity of practical reasoning is one tied into the 
pursuit of such goods and the avoidance of evil. God is to be loved, 
according to Aquinas, but the love of God is not fundamental to practical 
reasoning. Rather, love of God is something that is conducive to happiness 
and therefore falls under the general principle already stated.
Scotus' view of the will includes what Aquinas calls the rational 
appetite, which is captured in the affection for the advantageous. But the real 
source of freedom in the will is the affection for justice. The dynamic of the 
affection for justice differs from the advantageous, and it is the dynamic of the 
former that underpins Scotus' view of practical reasoning. As a result of the 
affection for justice, Scotus must account for moral obligation in a radically 
different way than Aquinas.
II. Moral Obligation
For Aquinas, moral obligation is reducible to each person's desire for 
happiness, which is construed in terms of the rational will. The will, for 
Scotus, does not of necessity seek happiness, at least not in its inclination for 
justice. Hence, for Scotus, the will's desire for happiness cannot be the 
ground for moral obligation in the Thomistic manner. The basic moral 
principle is that God is to be loved. Loving God entails obeying his 
commands. Basic moral obligation is justified, by Scotus, in terms of our 
capacities insofar as our will mandates we should love God. The obligation 
that we have to do or refrain from doing anything else is in turn justified by
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God œmmanding us to do or refrain from doing those things. In the following
passage, Scx)tus discusses the moral status of the principles found in the
Decalogue. The passage concerns both the justification of their obligating
force and our knowledge of the principles.
One way is as first practical principles known from their terms or as 
conclusions necessarily entailed by them. These are said to belong to 
the natural law in the strictest sense, and there can be no dispensation 
in their regard...But this is not the case when we speak in general of all 
the precepts of the second table [of the Decalogue]. For the reasons 
behind the commands and prohibitions there are not practical 
principles that are necessary in an unqualified sense, nor are they 
simply necessary conclusions from such. For they contain no 
goodness such as is necessarily prescribed for attaining the goodness 
of the ultimate end, nor in what is forbidden is there such malice as 
would turn one away necessarily from the last end, for even if the good 
found in these maxims were not commanded, the last end [of man as 
union with God] could still be loved and attained, whereas if the evil 
proscribed by them were not forbidden, it would still be consistent with 
the acquisition of the ultimate end (Ord/naf/o III, suppl., dist. 37).
Aquinas believes that all of the moral principles found in the Decalogue
are necessary and unchangeable given our nature as rational, social animals.
Moreover, those same principles are discernible and knowable through a
rational reflection upon the various inclinations of human nature and a
consequent coordination of the pursuit of the objects/goods to which those
inclinations tend. Therefore, for Aquinas, the Decalogue is a specification of
the first basic principle of practical reason of doing good, etc. Scotus does
not believe the principles of the Decalogue are necessary or even
unchangeable given human nature.
Scotus maintains that love of God is logically possible even if a person
were to murder, commit adultery, steal, etc.. The goods specified by the
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Decalogue, then, are not necessary to the fulfillment of the Scotistic basic 
principle of loving God. Moreover, the obligation to abide by the principles 
cannot be derived from the good or evil endorsed or prohibited by the given 
principle. Rather, the obligation is derived from the fact that God commands 
those things. For Scotus, then, morality is largely equivalent to obedience to 
God's commands.
iii. Source of Moral Authority
Scotus extends his discussion of the moral precepts from the second 
table, i.e., moral standards that do not directly relate to God, in an interesting 
way. He notes that although these moral precepts do not follow necessarily
from the basic principle of loving God, they are in exceeding harmony with it.
The other way in which things belong to the law of nature is because 
they are exceedingly in harmony with that law, even though they do not
follow necessarily from those first practical principles known from their 
terms, principles which are necessarily grasped by any intellect 
understanding those terms. Now, it is certain that all the precepts of 
the second table also belong to the natural law in this way, since their 
rightness is very much in harmony with the first practical principles that 
are known of necessity (Ord/naf/o III, suppl., dist. 37).
The picture that emerges here is one where a person of at least average
epistemic capacity can know all basic moral principles in much the same way
as on Aquinas' account. However, for Scotus, God is doing humanity a favor
by making these principles such that they are understandable and conducive
to happiness. Moreover, God can change these precepts at any time in virtue
of His omnipotence. A person's capacities, then, though reliable with respect
to what is appropriate for humans to do, do not grant the authority to exercise
self-govemance.
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With the ethical theory of Scotus, there occurs a fracturing of what I 
have called the Platonic biconditional, which states that possessing 
psychological capacities requisite for self-governance is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for possessing the proper authority to exercise self- 
govemance. The source of moral authority, or the right to govern oneself, is 
characterized by Aquinas as reason itself. If a being possesses reason, then 
it has the appropriate authority to direct itself to its end. Moreover, if a being 
possesses the rightful authority to self-rule, tf%n it must possess reason.
For Scotus, human beings do possess reason, but the possession of 
reason does not bring with it the authority of self-direction. God wants us to 
live voluntarily according to the principles He sets out for us. So, there is a 
sense in which God wants us to rule ourselves according to His law. 
However, the authority to do so is something He gives to humanity. The 
authority is not derivable from our psychological capacities. Scotus thus 
drives a wedge between the biconditional components. Subsequent moral 
theorists, especially in the 16**^  century, sever any connection between them. 
Thinkers in Schneewind's self-govemance tradition look for ways to remove 
the seat of moral authority from God and place it elsewhere. Schneewind 
hails Kant for doing just this through his notion of the self-legislation of the 
moral law.
But as I have maintained throughout this project, many of the 
discoveries or inventions attributed by Schneewind to thinkers in the modem 
period are better understood as re-discoveries or re-inventions. For prior to
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Scotus and the rise of voluntarism, divine command theory, and changes in 
how human nature's capacities were understood, self-govemance and related 
notions flourished in ethical thought. Schneewind is correct in thinking that 
some early modern theorists, such as Machiavelli and Montaigne, were 
reacting strongly against an established obedience-based tradition of 
morality. But he is mistaken in thinking that Aquinas belonged to this tradition.
iv. Summary and Conclusion
Schneewind claims that moral theory prior to the modem period 
revolves around the concept of obedience. In this dissertation, I have shown 
that there is a rich tradition of incorporating self-govemance at the heart of 
ethical theory that reaches back to at least Socrates. Self-govemance forms 
the backbone of the eudaimonist tradition in ethics. My account of the 
eudaimonistic self-govemance tradition that includes Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine suggest that Schneewind's view is 
mistaken. My detailed account of Aquinas' notion of self-governance and its 
place in his ethical theory confirms it. Aquinas included, developed, and 
endorsed a robust conception of self-govemance in his ethics. We who look 
to history to help solve contemporary problems should bring his account to 
bear on current issues of self-governance.
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